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Due Diligence and Gender Violence:
Parsing its Power and its Perils
Julie Goldscheid & Debra J. Liebowitz†
Human rights advocates increasingly invoke the due diligence standard to hold States responsible for their actions and omissions with respect
to gender violence. This Article traces the development of the due diligence obligation and analyzes how the United Nations, European, and
Inter-American human rights systems interpret the due diligence principal
in the guiding international documents and developing gender violence
case law. On its face, the due diligence obligation calls on the State to take
responsibility for preventing gender violence, prosecuting and punishing
perpetrators, and protecting and providing redress for gender violence victims. The notion of State responsibility for gender violence offered by the
due diligence obligation is foundational, and is appealing in many ways,
particularly when considering the near-universal history of non-responsiveness to, State approval of, and all-too-frequent participation in gender
violence.
We argue that emerging interpretations of the due diligence obligation, as applied to gender violence, pay insufficient attention to the risks of
State intervention. While State response is clearly needed, we should be
cautious about the ramifications of the demand. A reflexive focus on State
response can encourage an undue emphasis on criminal justice responses,
with adverse consequences such as arrests of survivors and other
unwanted interventions that thwart, rather than advance, fundamental
human rights principles of safety, equality, and dignity. This focus risks
situating the State as the entity charged with program delivery when other
entities would be more effective. An appropriate model of state responsiveness should explicitly grant the State discretion not to respond, or to delegate its response to other stakeholders such as community members,
survivors, NGOs, and advocates. It should consider the impact of any
intervention on those at the margins— particularly those from racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities— and should take into account the
experiences and recommendations of both advocates and survivors. A
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careful balancing of the need for State accountability with the risk of overintrusiveness can best advance foundational human rights principles, such
as non-discrimination, equality, autonomy, and dignity, in service of ending gender violence and advancing justice.
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Introduction
Human rights advocates increasingly invoke the due diligence standard as a tool in efforts to address gender violence via the international
human rights system. That standard extends human rights protections to
violations committed by non-State actors by holding States “responsible for
private acts if they fail to act with due diligence”1 to prevent gender violence, to prosecute and punish perpetrators, and to protect and provide
redress for its victims.2 International human rights bodies and some
States’ national courts now recognize the due diligence principle in their
decisions and policy discourse.3 That recognition reflects a critical
advance and is the product of concerted advocacy. As with all legal standards, the adoption of the legal obligation itself is only the first step
towards meaningful change. The next challenge is defining the scope and
implications of what it would mean for a State to discharge, or to fail to
discharge, its due diligence obligation.
1. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
art. 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), [hereinafter DEVAW]. See also
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 11th Sess., General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 29, 1992),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.
htm#recom19 [hereinafter CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19].
2. See DEVAW, supra note 1, at art. 4(d).
3. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, In-depth study on all forms of violence against
women, 73, 89, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006).
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The increasing recognition of the due diligence obligation requires us
to grapple with what it means to call for State responsiveness.4 On its face,
the obligation calls on the State to take responsibility for addressing gender
violence. State response can take many forms: from legislative and executive actions, to criminal justice interventions, to State-sponsored provisions
of services. The notion of State responsibility is important, and is appealing in many ways, particularly when considering the near-universal history
of non-responsiveness to, State approval of, and all-too-frequent participation in gender violence. But as this principle is newly applied to cases of
gender violence, lessons from advocacy should be taken into account. The
due diligence obligation’s focus on State responsibility should be viewed
with a cautious eye in light of the potential and proved hazards of State
involvement. While asking governments to respond to gender violence, we
should be cautious about the ramifications of the demand and should
guard against over-reach and its attendant harms.5 Conscious consideration of the scope of invited State action should be part of the analysis, both
as a tool for implementation and for measurement of compliance, because
the very notion of the State as actor can be problematic.
As many have detailed, advocacy for increased State responsiveness
has sometimes led to an over-reliance on criminal justice responses. This
has had disproportionate and harmful impacts, particularly on those from
racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities.6 In these contexts, calling
for more State action can be counterproductive to shared goals of safety,
autonomy, and equality. The calls for State response to gender violence
also raise the question of how much and what kinds of interventions are
sufficient to satisfy international human rights obligations. Importantly,
notions of State responsiveness should include the exercise of discretion
for the State not to respond, or to delegate its response to other stakeholders, such as community members, survivors, NGOs, and advocates.
This Article aims to take stock and to offer suggestions at this moment
of application of and burgeoning jurisprudence interpreting the due diligence principle. While the project of implementation is inherently challenging, it is particularly so when navigating in an arena of fundamentally
contentious concepts, policies, and interventions, and when considering
not simply whether the State should respond, but how the State should
respond. Part I traces the development of the due diligence principles as
4. See generally JULIE GOLDSCHEID & DEBRA LIEBOWITZ, DUE DILIGENCE PROJECT, DUE
DILIGENCE & STATE RESPONSIBILITY TO ELIMINATE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, REGION: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND & UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2014), available at http://
www.duediligenceproject.org/Resources_files/Australia%20Regional%20Report%20
Final%200315.pdf. This paper draws on the authors’ experience working on a report
that is part of the Due Diligence Project, a global project that aims to elaborate what the
due diligence principle means on the ground by drawing on the experiences and perspectives of NGO-based advocates. See generally http://www.duediligenceproject.org.
5. Accord GEORGE J. ANDREOPOULOUS & ZEHRA F. KABASAKAL ARAT, THE USES AND
MISUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO ADVOCACY 8 (2014) (recognizing
tension between feminist advocacy for criminalization of gender violence and criminalization’s detrimental racialized consequences).
6. See id. at 20.
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they apply to issues of gender violence, including a summary of commentary expounding on the principles’ promise. The discussion highlights the
reasons why the due diligence obligation is a promising framework for
holding States accountable for responding to gender violence. Part II contrasts the prospect of the State as the agent of change with the ways State
intervention has proved problematic in law and policy responses to gender
violence. This Part focuses in particular on States’ roles in perpetrating
gender violence, and details how State-sponsored interventions in cases of
private violence, particularly through criminal justice and related interventions, have often served to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, rights violations. Part III analyzes key themes reflected in the guiding normative
documents and case law, which adopt and broadly interpret States’ due
diligence obligation. While a robust view of the State’s required response
holds much promise, it also risks “state overreach.” The breadth of recommended or mandated remedies, combined with the risk that a call for State
response is interpreted as a call for stronger criminal justice responses,
may exacerbate rather than ameliorate harm.7 The sweep of the obligation
raises further questions about whether or how compliance might be
assessed, and about whether or when the State can delegate the obligation
to respond. Part IV offers suggestions for ways to balance the need for
State accountability with the risk of over-intrusiveness as the due diligence
principles continue to be used to advance legal claims and policy initiatives
in global efforts to end gender violence.
I. Due Diligence and Gender Violence
Putting international human rights law to effective use requires a clear
understanding of the complexity of State obligation as well as sound
frameworks for evaluating State performance. Although international law
unambiguously obligates State actors to refrain from committing human
rights violations, the progressive realization of rights necessitates a broader
understanding of the concept; one that includes measures to prevent
human rights abuses before they happen, to prosecute effectively and punish them once they have been committed, and to ensure the provision of
effective redress for individuals and groups that have been subject to rights
violations. These obligations extend to violations committed by non-State
actors, which, in the case of gender violence, most typically occur in the
private sphere.8 The principle of ‘due diligence’ captures this amplified
notion of State obligation in cases where a “State’s indifference or inaction
7. In this way, the development of the due diligence principle with respect to gender violence risks engendering unintended outcomes contrary to human rights principles’ underlying goals. See id. at 14– 15.
8. See, e.g., Rachel Hammonds & Gorik Ooms, World Bank Policies and the Obligation of Its Members to Respect, Protect and Fulfill the Right to Health, 8 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. 26, 28 (No. 1 2004). See generally John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a
Framework for Business and Human Rights, 3 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 189, 192 (Spring 2008).
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provides a form of encouragement and/or de facto permission”9 for gender
violence. The ‘due diligence’ principle is now generally understood to
include an obligation on the State to prevent, protect against, prosecute,
punish, and provide redress for acts of violence against women (“5Ps”).10
It implicates the State as bearing responsibility for preventing and responding to rights violations committed by individuals and other non-State
actors, and makes clear that effectively addressing gender violence necessitates the engagement of oft-uninvolved State entities.11
The development and application of the due diligence obligation to
cases of gender violence is occurring in a context in which the battle to
gain recognition of gender violence as a problem has largely been won,
albeit recently.12 It is also occurring in a context in which the “greatest
challenge” facing human rights movements today is widely seen as imple9. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter CAT
Gen. Comment 2].
10. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences,
The Due Diligence Standard As a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Commission on Human Rights, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by Yakin
Ertürk) [hereinafter Ertürk Due Diligence Report]. Although the standard may be
expressed in terms that vary, the essence of the obligation is the same. See, e.g., Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Ad Hoc Committee on preventing and
combating violence against women and domestic violence (CAHVIO), Interim Report, Council of Europe, ¶¶ 7, 72 (May 27, 2009), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
standardsetting/convention-violence/CAHVIO/CAHVIO_2009_4%20FIN_en%20_2.pdf
(discussing the due diligence obligation in terms of three or four “Ps”).
11. See generally Michelle Madden Dempsey, Toward a Feminist State: What Does
Effective Prosecution of Domestic Violence Mean?, 70 MOD. L. REV. 908, 910– 11 (2007).
12. The key women’s human rights treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), was signed in 1979 and came into
force in 1981, and includes no mention of violence against women. Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]. See generally BONITA MEYERSFELD,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INT’L LAW (2012) (explaining the comprehensive history of the
relationship between domestic violence and international human rights law). The
CEDAW Convention’s drafters were conscious of the need to ensure support and did not
want the document to be perceived as undermining women’s rights. The omission of
the issue was part of the negotiation that made CEDAW palatable for State ratification.
See generally CEDAW. Women’s rights activism over the ensuing three decades has created a rather dramatic shift in the international human rights policy landscape. Beginning in 1989 with the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 12, followed by
its more developed General Recommendation 19 (1992), policy and legal discussions
now treat interventions to address gender violence as key to women’s human rights.
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 8th Sess., General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against Women, (1989), available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm [hereinafter CEDAW Gen.
Rec. 12]; CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 1. Indeed, the CEDAW Committee’s jurisprudence and review of State party reports centrally address the issue. Furthermore,
two regional treaties specifically on violence against women have come into force. See
generally Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do
Pará, 1994,” June 9, 1994, available at www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-61.html
[hereinafter Convention of Belém do Pará]. See also Council of Europe, Council of
Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domes-
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mentation.13 The focus on implementation comes from all corners of the
human rights field, and it is part and parcel of why the due diligence standard has received increased attention.14 The focus on implementation of
human rights norms is the result of a maturing international system,15 one
that is increasingly attentive to the gap between de jure and de facto human
rights protections as well as the role of the international system in ensuring
the fulfillment of human rights.
In the context of “fulfilling” or enforcing rights, there is a growing
body of commentary, much of it focusing in the area of gender violence,
discussing the due diligence principle’s meaning, application, and promise.16 Traditional concepts of State responsibility in international law, limited to specific violations ascribed to the government or its agents,
supported international human rights institutions’ practice of ignoring
gender violence.17 The due diligence framework expands this conception
of State responsibility in a number of key ways, making its application to
cases of gender violence particularly promising for a number of reasons.
First, the due diligence obligation explicitly challenges the public-private divide that historically undergirds international law by articulating the
relationship between State responsibility and human rights violations by
non-State actors. International law’s embrace of the public-private dichotomy obscures the fact that violence experienced in private life constitutes a
human rights violation; the due diligence obligation, most agree, explicitly
challenges this formulation.18 Writing about State accountability to
tic Violence, May 11, 2011, available at www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/
Html/210.htm [hereinafter Istanbul Convention].
13. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, The Challenge of Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Law in the Cotton Field Case, 15 CUNY L. REV. 315, 316 (2012).
14. See id.
15. Brooke Stedman, The Leap from Theory to Practice: Snapshot of Women’s Rights
Through a Legal Lens, 29 MERKOURIOS: UTRECHT J. INT’L AND EUR. L. 4, 5 (2013) (framing
the evolution of State responsibility in the Inter-American and European human rights
systems as indicative of a move from negative to positive State obligations). Stedman
also frames the move from negative to positive State obligations as a “catalyst in the
promotion of women’s rights and protection against violence, as it is ultimately one of
the key mechanisms which ensures State accountability for adherence to human right
standards.” See id. at 13.
16. See generally Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 34, U.N.Doc. A/HRC/23/
49 (May 14, 2013) (by Rashida Manjoo) [hereinafter Manjoo Due Diligence Report].
17. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights
Issue, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 36, 39 (1993) (illustrating this point with inattention to domestic
violence).
18. See Carin Benninger-Budel, Introduction to DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION
TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 1, 2 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008). See also
Yakin Ertürk & Bandana Purkayastha, Linking Research, Policy and Action: A Look at the
Work of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 60 CURRENT SOC. 142, 145
(2012). For concerns about use of the due diligence standard, see Amy J. Sennett,
Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States of America: Defining Due Diligence?, 53 HARV. INT’L
L. J. 537, 545 (2012) (arguing that the due diligence obligation actually maintains the
public/private split by reifying the dichotomy between public and private acts of violence, and characterizing this “fictional” erasure as “invidious”).
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address economic rights violations, Daria Davitti argues that the due diligence obligation forces “corporate private actors” out of the “unregulated
periphery of international law.”19 Those focusing on addressing gender
violence have shown interest in developing the due diligence obligation for
precisely this reason. In its authoritative discussion of violence against
women, the CEDAW Committee defines State responsibility to address violence against women as requiring “appropriate and effective measures”20 to
address “private acts”21 committed by “any person, organization or enterprise.”22 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,
Rashida Manjoo, notes in her report on due diligence that violations do not
have to be directly attributable to the State to invoke the State’s obligation
to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights for all.23 States are also understood to be accountable for omissions, or for their failure to take appropriate steps to address rights violations, even when a non-State actor commits
the violation.24 Jan Arno Hessbruegge refers to this as a “diagonal obligation” of States, where States must work to prevent and protect individuals
and groups from rights-violating conduct of non-State actors.25
Second, with regard to gender violence, the due diligence obligation
shines a spotlight on prevention. With the goal of further specifying and
systematizing the due diligence obligation, Manjoo organizes State responsibility into two categories.26 The first— “individual due diligence”—
includes the obligations of States owed to individuals and groups.27 Fulfilling the due diligence obligation would require “effective remedies” that
take account of the full range of needs and preferences of those who have
been harmed.28 The second category— “systemic due diligence”— encompasses the obligations of States to create, monitor, and sustain a “holistic
model” of prevention, protection, punishment, and reparation.29 This twotier focus makes clear that due diligence requires both preventing repeti19. Daria Davitti, On the Meanings of International Investment Law and International
Human Rights Law: The Alternative Narrative of Due Diligence, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 421,
443– 44 (2012).
20. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 1, ¶ 24(a).
21. Id. ¶ 9.
22. Id.
23. Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, at ¶ 14 (quoting Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 MOD. L. REV.
598, 618 (2007)).
24. Ineke Boerefijn & Eva Naezer, Emerging Human Rights Obligations for Non-State
Actors, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 91,
92– 93 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008).
25. Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of NonState Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 25 (2005).
26. Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, ¶ 70.
27. Id.
28. Id. ¶¶ 29, 70. See also Yakin Ertürk, The Due Diligence Standard: What Does It
Entail for Women’s Rights?, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN
FROM VIOLENCE 27, 40 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008) (discussing due diligence at
the individual level).
29. Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, ¶ 71 (also noting that this
approach to the due diligence obligation has been adopted by the Committee on the
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tion of rights violations and providing justice to individual victims.30
The spotlight that “systemic due diligence” puts on prevention makes
the obligation particularly appealing for addressing gender violence,
because it serves as a corrective to the dominant focus on protection and
prosecution. Discussing the application of the due diligence standard to
addressing harmful traditional practices, Cecilia M. Bailliet argues that the
value of this approach is its attention to preventing violence by undermining the discriminatory gendered structures, ideas, and practices that buttress gender violence.31 In another context, a December 2010 decision of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example, applied
the due diligence requirement to the protection from violence towards
women living in camps for the internally displaced (IDP camps) in Haiti.32
The Commission found that the government’s knowledge of rapes and subsequent failure to require better security, lighting, and medical assistance
constituted a failure of their due diligence obligation to protect women living in twenty-two different IDP camps.33 The Commission recommended
a host of precautionary measures, such as better security and access to the
full range of medical and psychological care for victims, including provision of HIV prophylaxis and emergency contraception.34 This precedentsetting ruling “has the potential to expand the number and type of precautionary measures granted in rape cases in every country that has signed an
international convention with a due diligence clause.”35 This ruling demonstrates the due diligence obligation’s instrumentality in the evolution of
State responsibility for gender violence.
Third, related to the obligation of systemic prevention, the due diligence obligation requires that programs, policies, and practices address the
root causes of gender violence. In particular, this centers the link between
gender violence and gender discrimination by insisting that undoing preexisting “socio-cultural patterns that stand in the way of women’s full
access to justice” is necessary to any anti-gender violence program of
action.36 Attention to the root causes of violence have been variously interElimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Inter-American system).
30. Id. ¶ 73.
31. Cecilia M Bailliet, Persecution in the Home: Applying the Due Diligence Standard to
Harmful Traditional Practices within Human Rights and Refugee Law, 30 NORDIC J. HUM.
RTS. 36, 41– 42 (2012).
32. Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., Women and Girls Residing in 22 Camps for Internally
Displaced Persons in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Precautionary Measures, no. PM 340/10 OEA/
Ser.L/V/II., doc. 5 rev. 1 (2010).
33. Id.
34. Id. See also April Marcus, Grassroots Women’s Organizations’ Fight for Freedom
from Sexual Violence and Recognition Under Domestic and International Law, 14 CUNY L.
REV. 329, 335– 36 (2010).
35. Id. at 336.
36. Elizabeth A.H. Abi-Mershed, Due Diligence and the Fight Against Gender-Based
Violence in the Inter-American System, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT
WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 127, 136 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008); Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, ¶ 75 (“This implies that remedies should aspire, to the
extent possible, to subvert instead of reinforce pre-existing patterns of cross-cutting
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preted as, among others, requiring the combatting of gender stereotypes,37
tackling gendered economic inequalities,38 and providing access to political empowerment and decision-making.39 Attention to root causes challenges the notion that gender violence is a phenomenon distinct from the
wider field of gender equality and women’s rights.40 By accounting for the
roots of violence, the obligation easily accommodates an analysis of gender
violence that is linked to other forms of discrimination. It requires attention to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination because they are
part and parcel of the cause and consequences of gender violence,41 and it
provides a tool for challenging “cultural” or normalizing justifications for
gender violence.42
structural subordination, gender hierarchies, systemic marginalization and structural
inequalities that may be at the root cause of the violence that women experience.”). See
also, e.g., Calleigh McRaith et al., Due Diligence Obligations of the United States in the Case
of Violence Against Women, in Violence Against Women in the United States and the
State’s Obligation to Protect: Civil Society Briefing Papers on Community, Military and
Custody 9, 10 (2011), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/vaw.pdf.
37. Rikki Holtmaat, Preventing Violence Against Women: The Due Diligence Standard
with Respect to the Obligation to Banish Gender Stereotypes on the Grounds of Article 5(a)
of the CEDAW Convention, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN
FROM VIOLENCE 63, 64 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008). See generally REBECCA J. COOK
& SIMONE CUSAK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Bert B.
Lockwood, Jr. ed., 2010).
38. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16: The
Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(art. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 27, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005). This Comment acknowledges that implementing
the Convention
requires States parties, inter alia, to provide victims of domestic violence, who
are primarily female, with access to safe housing, remedies and redress for physical, mental and emotional damage; . . . and to ensure that women have equal
rights to marital property and inheritance upon their husband’s death. Genderbased violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to enjoy rights
and freedoms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a basis of
equality. States parties must take appropriate measures to eliminate violence
against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private actors. Id.
39. Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 78– 81.
40. Id. ¶ 100. The Report goes on to state:
The universal phenomenon of violence against women is the result of ‘historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of
women’s full advancement.’ However, in practice, the response to the issue of
violence against women has been fragmented and treated in isolation from the
wider concern for women’s rights and equality. Id.
41. See generally Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social
and Cultural, Including the Right to Development,, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/26, (May 2,
2011) (by Rashida Manjoo) (addressing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination) [hereinafter Manjoo 2011 Report].
42. Farida Shaheed, Violence against Women Legitimised by Arguments of ‘Culture’—
Thoughts from a Pakistani Perspective, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT
WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 241, 241 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008).
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Fourth, scholars explain that diligence must be assessed alongside
other general human rights principles (for example, equality and non-discrimination), as these principles, enshrined in human rights agreements,
are what give substantive meaning to the obligation.43 Making the connections between gender violence and the broader fight to address gendered
inequalities is critical to a robust application of the due diligence obligation and an adequate framing of State responsibility to address gender violence.44 Some have argued that the CEDAW Committee has robustly
connected due diligence with principles of non-discrimination and equality, while doing so conservatively in cases focusing on civil, political, or
economic rights.45
Fifth, scholars generally agree that the due diligence obligation is one
of means and not results.46 In other words, an act of domestic violence
itself would not be evidence of State failure to exercise due diligence. It is,
rather, “a lack of reasonableness in measures of prevention, and/or a lack
of seriousness in measures of response” that indicate such a failure.47 This
does not mean, however, that a State can simply claim that it did not have
the structures in place to prevent or redress acts of gender violence. This
defense fails because acting with due diligence requires the State to take
measures that “have a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating
the harm.”48
Although the vast majority of scholars and human rights advocates see
promise in the due diligence obligation to address a wide range of concerns, the use of the concept is still relatively new. A few scholars argue
that the obligation, as one of means and not results, is a weakness that
presents a potential danger.49 For example, as an obligation of conduct, it
runs the risk of being used as a defensive standard, with the State claiming
43. Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, ¶ 76. The Report explains:
The foundation for dealing with violence against women is laid down by the
general principles that define the nature of human rights, i.e., universality, inalienability, equality, non-discrimination, indivisibility, interdependence and
interrelatedness; and the principles related to the respect, protect and fulfil [sic]
goals of human rights. Thus participation, inclusion, the rule of law, and
accountability should be core values underpinning the State’s response when it
acts with due diligence to meet its obligations to eliminate violence against
women. Id.
44. See Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶ 100.
45. See generally Simone Cusack & Lisa Pusey, CEDAW and the Rights to Non Discrimination and Equality, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 54 (2013).
46. See, e.g., Abi-Mershed, supra note 36, at 137; Davitti, supra note 19, at 444.
47. See Abi-Mershed, supra note 36, at 137.
48. Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 14, ¶ 72. Although due diligence is
not an obligation of result, Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi’s review of court and arbitral
bodies’ decisions across the 19th and 20th centuries finds wide support for the view
that a State’s actions, when judged, should be compared internationally. See Gabe
Shawn Varges, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 568, 568 (1991) (reviewing RICCARDO
PISILLO MAZZESCHI, “DUE DILIGENCE” E RESPONSABILTÀ INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI, (A. Guiffrè ed. (1989)).
49. See e.g., Menno T. Kamminga, ‘Due Diligence’ Mania: The Misguided Introduction
of an Extraneous Concept into Human Rights Discourse 1 (Maastricht Faculty of Law,
Working Paper No. 2011/07).
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that even though the desired result was not achieved, it acted with diligence.50 Skeptics suggest that the lack of clarity of the obligation gives
States a door through which they can “escape responsibility.”51 Others,
while not wholly critical, recognize the potential danger, but indicate that
the jury is still out on the question of whether the obligation will be used to
weaken internationally agreed-upon human rights obligations.52
Finally, the flip-side of the concern about the principle’s imprecision
is its openness and flexibility. The due diligence obligation is open
enough to take account of a wide variety of circumstances. The obligation
is context- and fact-specific, providing a “flexible reasonableness standard.”53 Inadequate resources are not a valid excuse for failing to act with
diligence because State resources “must be allocated on a non-discriminatory basis.”54 Yet, as with many questions of implementation, translating
theory to practice surfaces myriad challenges. In this context, one key
challenge is how to frame and define the scope of invited State responses.
II. Cautionary Tale: the Limits of State Intervention
By definition, the due diligence obligation calls on the State to
increase its response to gender violence. Implicit in this concept is the
notion that State involvement is inherently useful and good. At the same
time, at a minimum, a turn to the State calls for critical reflection on the
risks as well as the benefits of an enhanced State role. The call for State
responsibility for gender violence is appealing and important, particularly
in light of the global history and, in some cases, enduring reality of States’
failure or refusal to recognize gender violence as a legal, social, and political wrong. But, as criticism in recent decades of advocacy details, the
State’s role in committing gender violence, and the dangerous ramifications of State involvement in efforts to end private violence, should lead us
to be cautious.55 Recognizing that the due diligence obligation applies to
50. See id. at 5.
51. Sennett, supra note 18, at 547.
52. See, e.g., ROBERT P. BARNIDGE, JR., NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM: APPLYING
THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DUE DILIGENCE PRINCIPLE 67 (2008) (citing
James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW 445, 460 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003) (noting that “affirmative
State action tends to attract objective responsibility, while a State’s failure to act, or omission, typically triggers subjective responsibility.”); Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, The History and Development of the Due Diligence Standard in International Law and Its Role in
the Protection of Women Against Violence, in DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 47, 57 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed., 2008); Stephanie Farrior, The Due Diligence Standard and Violence Against Women, 14 INTERIGHTS BULL. 150,
151 (2004).
53. BARNIDGE, supra note 52, at 138– 141.
54. Farrior, supra note 52, at 151.
55. Debate about the role of the State in addressing gender violence has animated
discourse over reforms for the last several decades. See generally CYNTHIA R. DANIELS,
FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1997) (examining
paradoxes of working with the state to address gender violence); SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT 185– 191 (1982) (discussing the contradictory effects of government involve-
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State responses to gender violence is a key advance; the challenge now is to
ensure that it is implemented in a way that takes into account both its
promise and its challenges.
Examples abound of sexual violence committed by State actors, both
as individuals acting in official or semi-official capacities, and through
group or collective actions. Sexual violence committed by the military,
both against members of the military and against civilians, is all too common.56 Tragic accounts of the widespread and systematic use of rape in
war starkly highlight this point.57 In other cases, the State turns a blind
eye toward abuses carried out by paramilitary forces as a way to deflect
culpability.58 Outside of military settings, women and girls, particularly
racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, are subjected to sexual
assault, rape, brutal strip-searches, beatings, and even shootings and killings by law enforcement and other state officials.59 As but one example,
the United Nations Committee Against Torture has noted with alarm
reports of women being subjected to sexual violence in police stations in
Guatemala.60 State agents explicitly advocate or frequently condone violence against sex workers,61 migrant women,62 and trans people.63
ment); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 182– 184
(2000) (tracing history of debates about the role of the State).
56. See, e.g., Sylvanna Falcon, “National Security” and the Violation of Women: Militarized Border Rape at the U.S.-Mexico Border, in THE COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE!
ANTHOLOGY 119 (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006) [hereinafter, THE
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY]; Doris Buss, Rethinking ‘Rape as a Weapon of War’, 17 FEMINIST
LEGAL STUD. 145 (2009) (discussing sexual violence and the Rwandan genocide).
57. See generally Dara Kay Cohen, Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National
Evidence (1980– 2009), 107(3) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461 (2013); Paul Kirby, How is Rape a
Weapon of War?: Feminist International Relations, Modes of Critical Explanation and the
Study of Wartime Sexual Violence, 19(4) EUR. J. INT’L REL. 797 (2013).
58. Julia Meszaros, The Continued Silencing of Torture in Kashmir, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-meszaros/the-continuedsilencing-kashmir_b_4821002.html (discussing the documentary, The Torture Trail, and
its treatment of the use rape of women by the Indian army and paramilitary groups).
59. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Women of Atenco, Mexico, Raped, Beaten, Never
Forgotten, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/cases/mexico-women-ofatenco (discussing a case where “dozens” of women “were subjected to physical, psychological and sexual violence by the police officers who arrested them”). See generally BETH
E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S PRISON NATION
47– 53 (2012) (describing violence by state agencies and against Black women in state
custody); Andrea J. Ritchie, Law Enforcement Violence Against Women of Color, in THE
INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 56, at 138– 50.
60. U.N. Comm. against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties
under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations on Guatemala, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/GTM/CO/4, ¶ 17 (July 25, 2006).
61. Anna-Louise Crago, “Bitches Killing the Nation”: Analyzing the Violent State-Sponsored Repression of Sex Workers in Zambia, 2004– 2008, 39(2) SIGNS 367, 372– 73 (2014)
(noting that police violence against sex workers is common in Zambia where they are
being blamed for the spread of HIV).
62. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences,
Integration of the Human Rights of Women and a Gender Perspective: Violence against
Women, Addendum, Mission to Mexico, ¶¶ 27, 29, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.4
(Jan. 13, 2006) (by Yakin Ertürk) (noting that Mexican migration law prohibits undocumented migrants in the country from accessing State officials so migrants from Guatemala, when subject to violence, have no legal recourse).
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Even when calling for increased State responsiveness to private violence, caution is warranted. Many scholars argue that the anti-violence
movement’s partnership with the State has resulted in a de-politicization,
professionalization, and standardization of the anti-domestic violence
movement, with a problematic emphasis on criminal justice responses.64
Others caution that mainstream approaches to gender violence serve to
reinforce women’s traditional roles, rather than targeting root causes and
gender-based inequalities.65
In particular, the due diligence standard’s explicit focus on prosecution and punishment amplifies concerns about inviting an enhanced State
role in criminal justice interventions.66 For many, the State, particularly as
embodied by the criminal justice system, is a perpetrator of violence rather
than a protector against violence. State criminalization and incarceration
policies exacerbate and perpetuate interconnected forms of gender violence, particularly for racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, and
for others from marginalized communities, such as indigenous, immigrant,
and disabled survivors.67 Criminal justice interventions have acute ramifi63. Jenna M Calton, et al., Barriers to Help Seeking for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence, in TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE
(2015), available at http://tva.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/05/14/152483801558
5318.abstract.
64. See, e.g., Conny Roggeband, Shifting Policy Responses to Domestic Violence in the
Netherlands and Spain (1980– 2009), 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 784, 801 (2012)
(explaining that the “success” of the anti-gender violence movement in gaining State
support “resulted in a decline of feminist mobilization” and ultimately a loss of early
policy gains). For critique of the anti-domestic violence movement’s partnership with
the State, see KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED
THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1– 15 (2008); Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get
Protection, 7(2) HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 17, 32– 33 (2004). See generally LEIGH GOODMARK,
A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2012); Donna Coker,
Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001); PATRICIA ENG WITH SHAMITA DAS DASGUPTA, MS. FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN, SAFETY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
WOMEN’S ANTI-VIOLENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2003), available at
files.praxisinternational.org/safety_justice.pdf; RICHIE, supra note 59.
65. See, e.g., Pinar Akpinar & Jasmine L. George, Violence compared: rape in Turkey
and India, 50.50 INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/pinarakpinar-jasmine-lovely-george/violence-compared-rape-in-turkey-and-india.
66. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Summary Paper,
The Due Diligence Standard for the Violence Against Women, 4, available at http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/rapporteur/docs/SummaryPaperDueDilli
gence.doc (describing potential improvements for how “punishments” should be handled under the due diligence standard).
67. See, e.g., MICHELLE LINDLEY, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Submission
to the Coroners Court of Western Australia: Inquest into the Death of Andrea Louise Pickett,
No. 41/09 (2012), available at https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/con
tent/legal/submissions_court/guidelines/Submissions%2025%20June%202012%20%
282%29.pdf (discussing the findings of the Australian Human Rights Commission that
State agents such as the coroner, parole system, police, and Department of Corrective
Services inadequately investigated and responded to cases of domestic violence, particularly in relation to Aboriginal women). See generally Angela Y. Davis, Violence Against
Women and the Ongoing Challenge to Racism (1985) (connecting violence against
women with racism and global imperialism); JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE:
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cations for women accused or convicted of defending themselves against a
violent partner.68 In other cases, a dysfunctional criminal justice system
itself perpetrates many rights violations.69
Numerous examples illustrate the harmful ramifications of criminal
justice-driven policy responses to gender violence. For example, State
efforts to encourage law enforcement responsiveness have led to
mandatory interventions, such as mandatory arrests and no-drop prosecutions.70 Though some advocates support those reforms, the resulting dual
arrests and arrests of women who use violence in self-defense raise a number of concerns.71 Multiple collateral consequences can follow a victim’s
arrest. For example, arrest records can jeopardize women’s parental rights,
through child-welfare interventions or the use of an arrest record in custody hearings.72 Battered immigrant women may be reluctant to call the
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 118– 140 (2011) (critiquing
criminal legal responses to violence against LGBT people); RICHIE, supra note 59, at
99– 124 (tracing the trajectory and impact of the criminal justice response on African
American women); Crago, supra note 61, at 373 (noting that police violence against sex
workers is common in Zambia where they are being blamed for the spread of HIV);
Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation,
37 WASH. U. J. L & POL’Y 13, 23– 32 (2011) (tracing interconnections between criminalization, gender violence, and the interests of women, sexual minorities, racialized minorities, and straight-identified men).
68. See, e.g., Julie Sudbury, Lessons from the Black Women’s Movement in Britain, in
THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 56, at 13– 21 (discussing the criminalization of
women of color who experience male violence); Abbe Smith, The “Monster” in All of Us:
When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 367, 370 (2005) (challenging
the sharp distinction between victims and perpetrators); Kana Takamatsu, Domestic Violence Victims as Homicide Offenders: A Study of Gender Ideology in the Japanese Criminal
Justice System, 8(2) GENDER, TECH. & DEV. 255, 260 (2004) (arguing that women criminal offenders are punished more harshly if their “character” is seen as deviating from the
dictates of traditional gender norms). See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
69. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, BROKEN SYSTEM: DYSFUNCTION, ABUSE, AND IMPUNITY IN
THE INDIAN POLICE, 51– 52, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
india0809web.pdf (discussing dysfunction in the Indian police system, including discrimination against victims of gender-based violence).
70. See, e.g., U.N Div. for the Advancement of Women in the Dept. of Econ. & Soc.
Affairs, Handbook for Legislation on Violence Against Women, 37– 39 U.N. Doc. ST/
ESA/329 (2010) [hereinafter UN Handbook for Legislation].
71. See, e.g., id. at 38 (discussing dual arrests); Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra
note 16, ¶ 5; CEDAW Comm., Concluding Observations: Canada, ¶¶ 29– 30, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/7 (Nov. 7, 2008) (expressing concern about “dual charging” and
urging “primary aggressor” policies); Rochelle Braaf & Clare Sneddon, Arresting Practices: Exploring Issues of Dual Arrest for Domestic Violence, AUSTL. DOMESTIC AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE CLEARINGHOUSE 1– 2 (Dec., 2007), available at http://www.adfvc.unsw.edu.au/
PDF%20files/Stakeholder%20paper_%203.pdf (discussing concerns with dual arrests);
About Us, NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN, http://
www.ncdbw.org/about.htm (describing the advocacy and support of battered women
charged with crimes related to their battering given by the organization).
72. See generally Cynthia L. Chewter, Violence Against Women and Children: Some
Legal Issues, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L. 99, 140 (2003– 2004) (explaining that although domestic
violence can be used as evidence in divorce and custody proceedings in Canada, concerns exist that legislation does not require judges to take account of domestic violence
when determining custody).
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police for fear of harmful immigration-related ramifications.73 Women
who are part of racial or ethnic minority communities face police biases
that influence which women are seen as “true” victims and which are
not.74 LGBT survivors may resist criminal justice interventions because of
fears that law enforcement either will not respond, will arrest and criminalize both parties, or will respond with homophobic comments that further
subject them to abuse.75 Furthermore, in at least seventy-six countries,
laws criminalize some form(s) of private, consensual, same-sex behavior.76
For LGBT communities in these countries, using the criminal justice system to address gender violence is largely inconceivable.
Unchecked, the due diligence principle’s call for State responsiveness
poses the risk of exacerbating these concerns. On its face, the due diligence principle’s enumeration of States’ obligations to “prosecute” and
“punish” are invitations to expand criminal justice interventions.77
Indeed, criminal justice-related reforms may be among the most common
measures taken to meet international obligations under CEDAW.78 Advocates may seek criminal justice responses, particularly in contexts where
formal mechanisms do not punish, or where they condone, gender violence. In some places, however, inter-personal violence may not be seen as
a local issue that can be addressed by law enforcement interventions.79 In
the case of Armenia, for example, locals interpreted the focus on criminal
justice responses and accompanying State services (like shelters and hotlines, for example), as a “Western” import, making it difficult to develop
national support for addressing domestic violence.80 While the decision
whether to advocate for particular reforms can only be made in local contexts, the limits of criminal justice strategies should be part of the calculus.
The perils of State involvement surface when considering the other
due diligence obligations as well. For example, in connection with “prevention,” States may tout prevention or education programs as meeting inter73. See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for
Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 60 (2003) (demonstrating battered
immigrant women’s reluctance to call police).
74. See THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY, supra note 56, at 38– 40.
75. See, e.g., MOGUL, et al., supra note 67, at 132– 40; Kae Greenberg, Still Hidden in
the Closet: Trans Women and Domestic Violence, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 198
(2012).
76. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Free & Equal, U.N. for LGBT
Equality, Fact Sheet: Criminalization, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Discrimination/LGBT/FactSheets/unfe-30-UN_Fact_Sheets_Criminalization_Eng
lish.pdf.
77. See CEDAW Gen Rec. 19, supra note 1, ¶ 9.
78. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination:
Comparing American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 355, 389
(2006) (reviewing country reports submitted to Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women).
79. See, e.g., Armine Ishkanian, En-gendering Civil Society and Democracy-Building:
The Anti-Domestic Violence Campaign in Armenia, 14(4) SOC. POL 488, 492 (2007).
80. Id.
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national obligations, but the programs may not address root causes.81
States may authorize but fail to allocate adequate funding for these programs. Furthermore, States may laud programs that could be seen as meeting the obligation to “protect,” but access to these programs may be limited
by lack of funding, inadequate publicity, or by other measures of accessibility, affordability, and suitability, such as physical location, accessibility
for disabled women, and language access.82 Government prevention programs may ostensibly adopt a “gender neutral” approach to gender violence, but doing so may serve to erase the ways gender violence
disproportionately impacts women.83 In addition, government’s role in
prevention programs may have punitive attributes. For example, “protective” services may remove children from a non-abusive mother for “witnessing” domestic violence committed by an abuser.84 States may cite victim
compensation programs that can provide “redress,” but strict eligibility
rules, publicity, and requirements of law enforcement involvement may
effectively render redress unavailable.85
The question of how to advocate for State responsiveness in a manner
that leverages the State’s role, resources, and power but does not further
perpetuate discrimination, abuse, and inequality mirrors other “feminist”
debates about how to locate and define the role of the State. For example,
feminists have critiqued the hazards of State intrusions into women’s lives
through policies criminalizing pregnant women based on HIV status and
81. See, e.g., GOLDSCHEID & LIEBOWITZ, supra note 4, at 23 (discussing the concerns
of New Zealand anti-violence advocates that the “‘Taskforce for Action on Violence
within Families’ signature prevention effort— the ‘It’s not OK’ campaign— does not adequately tackle the root causes of violence experienced by migrant and refugee women.”
Anti-violence advocates from Australia make a similar point about the government’s
“Respectful Relationship” campaign that “seeks to reduce sexual assault and domestic
and family violence by through educational institutions and curricula.”).
82. Id. at 18.
83. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
52nd Session, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/7, ¶ 9 (Aug. 6, 2012).
The Committee raises this point with the government of New Zealand, noting
with concern a number of challenges that continue to impede the full implementation of the Convention in the State party, including the recourse to genderneutral language with respect to gender-based violence, including domestic violence; . . . the status of vulnerable groups of women, including women with
disabilities and minority women. Id.
84. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the practice of removing children from non-offending battered mothers unconstitutional). See also GOLDSCHEID & LIEBOWITZ, supra note 4, at 35 (reporting concerns of
advocates in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States that “failure to protect” laws were used against non-abusive mothers and resulted in women losing custody
of their children as a result of an abusive partner’s conduct).
85. See, e.g., UN Handbook for Legislation, supra note 70, at 52– 53 (discussing the
importance of compensation programs); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, supra note 83, ¶¶ 9, 15, 16 (expressing concern about the New
Zealand government’s cuts and changes to their legal aid system because of the particular impact these changes are expected to have on women, particularly low-income and
indigenous women); Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World,
79 TUL. L. REV. 167 186– 95 (2004) (discussing program limitations).

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN202.txt

2015

unknown

Due Diligence and Gender Violence

Seq: 17

23-SEP-15

8:31

317

drug use.86 In a number of countries (for example Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Sierra Leone, and Niger) a mother can be charged for failing to take
the necessary anti-retroviral drugs designed to block HIV transmission to
the fetus in utero and during labor, delivery, and subsequent breastfeeding.87 Others debate the role of the State in the context of reforms that
would allocate resources to support a more responsive State.88 In still
others, feminists interrogate the role of State power in considering the role
of women and feminists in government and governmental bodies.89
III. The Role of the State and Due Diligence: Emerging Interpretations
A growing body of international human rights reports and decisions
from a range of adjudicatory entities form a body of authority confirming
States’ due diligence obligation to respond to gender violence. The following sections review those materials, which reflect both the promise of the
broadly framed due diligence obligation, and the risk that the emerging
doctrine legitimates State overreach and the potential to exacerbate gender
and racial discrimination.
A. Guiding Normative Documents
Starting with the CEDAW Committee’s 1992 General Recommendation 19,90 and The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women,91 almost all major international documents addressing gender
violence or violence against women have explicitly used the due diligence
principle to frame and expound State obligations.92 These documents
emanate from a wide range of international and regional human rights sys86. Aziza Ahmed, HIV and Women: Incongruent Policies, Criminal Consequences, 6
YALE J. INT’L AFF. 32, 32 (2011).
87. Criminalization of HIV Transmission, at http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/Planet
AIDS/Transmission.aspx (explaining that over sixty countries impose some criminal
penalties for transmission of HIV, or failure to disclose positive HIV status to sexual
partners, or both). For feminist critiques, see, e.g., CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN’S
EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS (2009); Elizabeth J. Chen,
Restoring Rights for Reproductive Justice, 22 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 281, 295– 298
(2014) (discussing the practices of sterilizing women in prison and shackling during
childbirth); Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of
Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012).
88. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER; THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); Martha A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the
Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010); Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism and the
Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFT REV. 97 (2009).
89. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law Over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 11 (2009) (suggesting that feminist successes in international law are more complicated than is often understood and
could be characterized as “The Exile of Inclusion”).
90. See CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 1.
91. DEVAW, supra note 1, at art. 4(c).
92. The partial exception to this rule is the Maputo Protocol which incorporates the
content of the due diligence obligation, and is based on other international agreements
that explicitly embrace it, but itself does not use the term. On the incorporation of the
due diligence obligation into the text of the Maputo Protocol, see Manjoo Due Diligence
Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 39– 40.
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tems and bodies, and provide a conceptual and legal underpinning for
adjudicating individual claims. In addition to the decisions and interpretative jurisprudential statements of the treaty bodies, two regional treaties
specifically on violence against women used due diligence to explain the
scope of State obligation: The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention
of Belém do Pará, 1994) and Council of Europe Convention on Preventing
and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul
Convention, May 12, 2011).93 The 1994 resolution establishing the mandate of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, likewise emphasized that States
have a due diligence obligation with regard to preventing, investigating,
punishing, and providing redress for acts of violence against women.94
Perhaps not surprisingly, each of the individuals who have served in this
Special Rapporteur post have issued thematic reports that have further
contributed to the development of the due diligence concept.95 The United
Nations Secretary-General’s comprehensive study on violence against
women and a number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions
also affirm the due diligence obligation.96
Taken together, these guiding documents97 situate gender violence in
the human rights frame and, in so doing, have begun to provide meaning to
States’ due diligence obligation. They form a normative foundation upon
which case law on State responsibility to address gender violence is form93. Istanbul Convention, supra note 12.
94. Commission on Human Rights Res. 1994/45, Question of Integrating the Rights
of Women into the Human Rights Mechanisms of the United Nations and the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 50th Sess., Jan. 31– Mar. 11, 1994, ¶ 2 U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/RES/1994/45, (Mar. 4, 1994). The Commission explains:
[T]he duty of Governments to refrain from engaging in violence against women
and to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with
national legislation, to punish acts of violence against women and to take appropriate and effective action concerning acts of violence against women, whether
those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons, and to provide
access to just and effective remedies and specialized assistance to victims. Id.
95. See Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, and Ertürk Due Diligence
Report, supra note 10; Radihka Coomaraswamy, the first person to hold the position of
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences
(1994– 2003) did not focus the entirety of a report to the due diligence obligation but
did address in it a key report. See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its
Causes and Consequences, Violence Against Women in the Family, ¶¶ 22– 25, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68ds (Mar. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/72e640b38c51653b802567530056
6722?Opendocument [hereinafter Coomaraswamy 1999 Report].
96. See Secretary-General, In Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women,
U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July, 6 2006) [hereinafter Sec’y Gen. 2006 In-Depth Study].
See also G.A. Res. 61/143, ¶¶ 7, 8(h), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/143 (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/A_RES_61_143.pdf [hereinafter G.A.
Res. 61/143].
97. Here we are using the term “guiding document” or “guiding normative documents” broadly to refer to the material, unrelated to case law, produced by or in connection with the treaty bodies, human rights conventions, resolutions by key international
organizations, and the reports of the UN Special Rapporteurs.
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ing.98 These guiding documents frame States’ due diligence obligation
with regard to gender violence in sweeping terms, explaining that a State’s
failure to respond to gender violence committed by non-State actors makes
it “as guilty as the perpetrators.”99 These guiding documents generally reason that State “indifference or inaction provides a form of encouragement
and/or de facto permission” for rights violations and that States must be
held accountable for these failures under international law.100 In her
report on due diligence, Manjoo echoes the consensus that the obligation
links State responsibility to non-State conduct in a comprehensive fashion:
International human rights law requires a state to take measures— such as
by legislation and administrative practices— to control, regulate, investigate
and prosecute actions by non-state actors that violate the human rights of
those within the territory of that state. These actions by non-state actors do
not have to be attributed to the state, rather this responsibility is part of the
state’s obligation to exercise due diligence to protect the rights of all persons
in a state’s territory.101

In addition to articulating broadly a link between State responsibility
and the behavior of non-state actors, the guiding documents explain that a
State must “exercise whatever diligence is due” in each case.102 Although
the guiding documents often include a list of relevant issues or specifications of the obligation, they all start by explaining that State responsibility
includes the broadest range of anti-violence efforts.103 The Convention of
Belém do Pará explains that States must “apply due diligence to prevent,
investigate and impose penalties for violence against women”104 and that
they must “take all appropriate measures . . . to amend or repeal existing
laws and regulations or to modify legal or customary practices which sustain the persistence and tolerance of violence against women . . . .”105 In
addition, the first of the Special Rapporteur’s thematic reports dedicated to
explaining the due diligence obligation indicates the need for States to
intervene at the “individual, community, State and transnational” levels “in
order to prevent, protect, prosecute and provide compensation with regard
to violence against women . . . .”106
The United Nations Committee against Torture articulates a similarly
broad frame for State obligation to address gender violence:
98. See infra pt. III.B for a discussion of relevant case law.
99. Coomaraswamy 1999 Report, supra note 95, ¶ 39.
100. CAT Gen. Comment 2, supra note 9, ¶ 18. See generally Hessbruegge, supra note
25.
101. Manjoo Due Diligence Report, supra note 16, ¶ 14 (citing Robert McCorquodale
& Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 MOD. L. REV. 598,
618 (2007)).
102. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341, 372
(2010).
103. Id. at 372.
104. Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 12, at art. 7(b).
105. Id. at art. 7(e).
106. Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶ 76.
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When State officials “know or have reasonable grounds to believe” that nonState or private actors are committing acts of torture or ill-treatment and they
“fail to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish”
these actors “the State bears responsibility and its officials should be considered as authors, complicit or otherwise responsible . . . for consenting to or
acquiescing in such impermissible acts.”107

The sweep of this obligation is part and parcel of its potential and power.
The obligation’s breadth makes it applicable to innumerable contexts and
fact patterns, and potentially responsive to the diversity of individual
experiences of gender violence. Indeed, the broad framing of the obligation is a product of the success of women’s rights and feminist advocacy at
the national and international levels, and must be understood as a
response to the history of indifference to gender violence by State actors in
all corners of the globe.108
At the same time that this obligation presents real potential for holding
States accountable for their failure to address gender violence, it also highlights three themes that illustrate how the obligation opens the door to
inappropriate or potentially harmful State action. First, the invitation for
greater State response is not paired with discussion about the appropriate
limits of State action; as a result, the invitation opens the door to an overemphasis on criminal justice responses to gender violence. Second, the
comprehensive framing of the obligation directs commensurately wideranging remedies that may make it very difficult, if not impossible, to monitor or measure State implementation. Finally, while the documents do at
times recognize that delegating the obligation to respond to gender violence is appropriate, they are not consistently careful about when or where
this should happen. As a result, they tip the balance in favor of the State as
the actor instigating, formulating, and executing the required remedies.
Each of these themes is explored in greater depth below.
1. Creating the Conditions for an Over-Emphasis on Criminal Justice
Responses to Gender Violence
The broad framing of the due diligence obligation is infused with a
consistent call for use of the criminal justice system to address gender violence. This focus on criminal justice engagement is, in part, a response to
historic and current State indifference to or complicity in gender violence.
While most would agree that some criminal justice engagement to address
gender violence is appropriate, the flip-side of the broad sweep of the obligation is that the guiding documents are not careful about the limits of
State action.109 As such they open the door to controversial forms of criminal justice intervention without problematizing those remedies. Illustrative
107. CAT Gen. Comment 2, supra note 9, ¶ 18.
108. Stephanie Farrior, Research Workshop Report, Gerald R. Ford School of Public
Policy, The Due Diligence Standard, Private Actors and Domestic Violence (Oct. 2010),
available at http://humanrightshistory.umich.edu/files/2012/10/Farrior1.pdf.
109. See, e.g., CAT Gen. Comment 2, supra note 9, ¶ 18; see also Hessbruegge, supra
note 25.
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of this endorsement of mandatory criminal justice policies is a 2010
United Nations General Assembly resolution, which requires:
. . . taking effective measures to prevent the victim’s consent from becoming
an impediment to bringing perpetrators of violence against women and girls
to justice, while ensuring that appropriate safeguards to protect the victim
and adequate and comprehensive measures for the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of violence into society are in place.110

The CEDAW Committee similarly interpreted State due diligence obligation in its 2010 General Recommendation, explaining that:
Where discrimination against women also constitutes an abuse of other
human rights, such as the right to life and physical integrity in, for example,
cases of domestic and other forms of violence, States parties are obliged to
initiate criminal proceedings, to bring the perpetrator(s) to trial and to impose
appropriate penal sanctions.111

These endorsements of mandatory criminal justice interventions in cases
of gender violence do not acknowledge the contentious debate about
whether removing discretion from women survivors of gender violence is a
good way to deal with the inadequate treatment of interpersonal violence
by law enforcement agencies.112 This framing of the issue is particularly
noteworthy given extensive feminist scholarship situating consent as central to sexual agency, bodily integrity, and human rights.113
While some feminist scholars and activists clearly support these types
of mandatory interventions, there can be no question that they are
extremely controversial. These documents, however, do not contextualize
their support for mandatory interventions with a discussion of the potential problems of such an approach. Furthermore, they do not acknowledge
the particularly fraught record of criminal justice interventions in minority
communities.114 Such unqualified support for mandatory criminal justice
intervention assumes that the State is a beneficent actor, one whose actions
to address gender violence are necessarily positive or benign. This frame
ignores what anti-violence advocates know: State action, especially in its
criminal justice manifestations, is frequently associated with problematic
110. G.A. Res. 65/187, ¶ 16(m), U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/187 (Dec. 21, 2010) (emphasis
added), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/523/76/
PDF/N1052376.pdf?OpenElement.
111. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of State Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
CEDAW Gen. Rec. 28] (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009); G.
Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 276– 77 (2005); Emily
J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1667– 69.
113. See, e.g., Jennie E. Burnet, Situating Sexual Violence in Rwanda (1990– 2001): Sexual Agency, Sexual Consent, and the Political Economy of War, 55 AFR. STUD. REV. 97
(2012).
114. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 68.
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consequences. Indeed, the explicit framing of nearly all State action to
address gender violence as desirable makes it difficult to address adequately and account for the uneven and checkered history of State engagement in this field.
2. Measuring and Monitoring State Implementation
Along with defining the scope of the due diligence obligation in the
broadest of ways, the guiding documents also demand commensurately
wide-ranging remedies from States. The Convention of Belém do Pará
requires, for instance, that States “[i]nclude in their domestic legislation
penal, civil, and administrative and any other type of provision that may be
needed to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women and to
adopt appropriate administrative measures where necessary.”115 The
Istanbul Convention demands similarly comprehensive remedies, noting
that “Parties shall take the necessary legislative and other measures to
adopt and implement State-wide effective, comprehensive and coordinated
politics encompassing all relevant measures to prevent and combat all
forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention and offer a holistic response to violence against women.”116 The demand for comprehensive remedies across all fields opens up important space for political and
legal action. It also provides the possibility of significant and transformative impact. At the same time, however, the all-encompassing framing of
the obligation makes it difficult to define the actions necessary to fulfill, to
monitor compliance of, or to limit appropriately State response.
Other policy statements elucidate a more specific set of required remedies, but these too are not paired with a concern or discussion of the appropriate limits of State action or how compliance might be measured. U.N.
General Assembly resolution 61/143 on violence against women, for
instance, requires that States provide “training and capacity-building on
gender equality and women’s rights for . . . health workers, teachers, law
enforcement personnel, military personnel, social workers, the judiciary,
community leaders and the media.”117 It also explains that States must
“exercise due diligence to prevent all acts of violence against women, which
may include improving the safety of public environments.”118 The Istanbul Convention also invites a long list of remedies including “easily accessible shelters in sufficient numbers” (Article 23), “specialist women’s
support services” (Article 22), and the ability to “claim compensation from
perpetrators” (Article 30). It also includes the demand for a host of relatively specific remedies like “state-wide round-the-clock (24/7) telephone
helplines free of charge” (Article 24) and “age-appropriate psychosocial
counseling for child witnesses” (Article 26). The Istanbul Convention further explains that adequate remedies require substantive legal manifestations with regard to civil lawsuits and legal remedies (Article 29),
115.
116.
117.
118.

Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 12, at art. 7(c).
Istanbul Convention, supra note 12, at art. 7(1).
G.A. Res 61/143, supra note 96, ¶ 8(m).
Id. ¶ 8(h).
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compensation for victims (Article 30), child custody and visitation (Article
31), and that the law must include adequate remedies for all forms of gender violence, including psychological (Article 33), stalking (Article 34),
physical (Article 35), sexual (Article 36), forced marriage (Article 37), and
sexual harassment (Article 40).119
These examples demonstrate the gamut of invited remedies, from the
most vague and sweeping to those that specify a general need for programs
or training for specific groups. The extremely broad scope of anticipated
State obligation and action must be seen against the backdrop of historic
State indifference to gender violence, and mark valuable recognition of the
breadth of needed legal and service based responses. Yet, the scope of the
obligation means that it is easier to identify when a State fails to do something than it is to define affirmatively the parameters of appropriate and
sufficient State action. For example, one might be able to identify programs or policies that fail to “empower” women, but detailing what constitutes empowerment is considerably more difficult.120 With regard to the
scope of the due diligence obligation, it is easier to count shelter beds than
it is to determine whether a shelter’s support services are attentive to issues
of difference among women.
In the face of this unmediated call for State engagement, determining
the point at which a remedy is sufficient, or what interventions are inappropriate or even harmful, is extremely difficult. The sweeping framework
means that most actions, programs, and policies could indeed be framed
as appropriate State responses. This problem of measurement is made
even more complicated by the unqualified embrace of criminal justice
responses. This is of particular concern when trying to determine whether
the offered remedies appropriately address the needs of women in specific
racial, ethnic, or immigrant communities, those who are disabled, or of sex
workers, or trans people.
3. State Agency and Accountability
Some of the key norm-setting documents exhibit a tendency to frame
the State as a knight in shining armor that should ride in on its anti-violence horse to prevent and prosecute gender violence. In so doing, these
documents fail to recognize that the “knight,” in his clanking, militaristic
garb may not be the most appropriate or desired “savior.” This framing of
the State as the key, and in some cases the only, actor responding to gender
violence makes it nearly impossible to recognize adequately the complexities of State action to address gender violence.
In some cases, the guiding documents articulate an all-encompassing
and insufficiently nuanced understanding of State action. Along these
lines, the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 28 interprets the
Convention as “impos[ing] a due diligence obligation on States parties to
119. Istanbul Convention, supra note 12.
120. Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 79– 80 (discussing “empowerment” as it relates to programming to address violence against women).
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prevent discrimination by private actors.”121 This key discussion of State
obligation, in other words, suggests that States are responsible for preventing discrimination by private actors. This mandate is qualitatively different
from one that obligates States to “take all appropriate measures” to prevent
gender violence by private actors. The CEDAW Committee even obligates
States to “ensure that private actors do not engage in discrimination against
women . . . .”122 While it is desirable to imagine a world where private
actors do not discriminate, it is not possible or desirable to conceive of a
State that has the power to “ensure” that this is the case. The framing of
State obligation in this way assumes that the State will use its power
benignly, and that its actions will unequivocally benefit women generally
and survivors of violence in particular. This assumption is particularly
troublesome when considering the power of the State as manifest in its
criminal justice system. Furthermore, this framing of the State as savior is
predicated on the erasure of the unevenness and problematic nature of
State involvement in racial, ethnic, and religious communities.123
As discussed above, the due diligence obligation is explicit about the
State’s obligation to take action to address gender violence perpetrated by
non-State actors.124 The guiding international documents reflect a tension
and lack of clarity with respect to whether the State must be the actor meeting its obligations, or whether it may delegate the response to other actors
such as NGOs.125 On the one hand, a number of policy proclamations
describe State responsibility in a way that contemplates either direct State
response or delegation.126 On the other hand, various statements, sometimes even in the same document, suggest that a State’s obligation to
address gender violence requires agents of the State to engage directly in
program development, service provision, and education efforts.127 This
formulation does not adequately distinguish between the State as duty
holder and the State as preferred responder, a distinction that is crucial to
trying to address and limit problematic or discriminatory actions perpetrated by agents of the State.
In the best cases, the guiding documents articulate States’ due diligence obligation in a way that holds them accountable for action without
also suggesting that the State ought to be the sole or the preferred
responder to gender violence. The Istanbul Convention employs language
that is consistently careful in this regard, indicating that States’ parties
should take “the necessary legislative and other measures”128 to fulfill its
obligations as enumerated in the Convention. The Convention of Belém do
121. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 28, supra note 111, ¶ 13.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. See supra notes 67 to 76.
124. See Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 79-80.
125. See id. ¶ 69.
126. See Lee Hasselbacher, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 190 (2009).
127. See Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶ 44.
128. Istanbul Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 4, 5, 7.
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Pará uses the phrase “by all appropriate means” to qualify a State’s obligation to act.129 The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women specifies that States must “ensure” that victims of violence, for instance, have
access to justice.130 Language like this takes State accountability for gender violence seriously without articulating a preference for direct State
response.
Many of the policy proclamations recognize the important role community-based organizations and NGOs play in addressing gender violence.
For example, the Special Rapporteur went as far as declaring that
“[s]helters are better operated by NGOs.”131 However, she was careful to
draw appropriately the lines of State accountability, explaining that the
State is ultimately responsible for ensuring shelters’ “creation, maintenance
and safety” as part of the State’s obligation to provide protection.132 In
other words, she frames the State as the duty holder under international
law but recognizes that its direct agents are often less effective service providers than non-governmental, community-based resources.
In contrast, many of the same guiding international documents also
use language that articulates a bias toward direct action by agents of the
State, obfuscating the fact that State action has effective limitations.
Demanding that States “undertake progressively specific measures, including programs” to promote awareness, modify social and cultural patterns,
and promote education and training, the Convention of Belém do Pará
focuses not on State accountability for action but on direct actions required
of State agents.133 Here, the State becomes both program initiator and
actor. Likewise, CEDAW’s General Recommendation 28 explains that
“States shall pay attention to the specific needs of (adolescent) girls by providing education on sexual and reproductive health and carrying out
programmes that are aimed at the prevention of HIV/AIDS, sexual exploitation, and teenage pregnancy.”134 In these cases, the State is the educator
and service provider without equivocation.
It is important for these documents to acknowledge clearly and consistently that acting with diligence does not mean that the State assumes
direct responsibility for private action, but rather that the State’s failure to
respond to the situation with diligence creates an additional layer of harm
for which the State is responsible. In the case of gender violence, it is
important to retain the distinction between the violence committed by the
non-State actor and the further harm created by the State’s failure to
attempt to prevent or respond appropriately to the violence. We should
expect the State to “take appropriate measures,” but not to be responsible
for categorically preventing discrimination by private actors. The elision of
this distinction charts an unrealistic concept of the State’s capacity, rests
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Convention of Belém do Parà, supra note 12, at art. 7(c).
See Ertürk Due Diligence Report, supra note 10, ¶ 82.
Id. ¶ 82.
Id. ¶ 83.
Convention of Belém do Parà, supra note 12, at art. 8.
CEDAW Gen. Rec. 28, supra note 111, ¶ 21 (emphasis added).
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on an inappropriately intrusive role of the State, and implies that all State
action with regard to addressing gender violence is constructive and
desirable.
B. Case Law
A growing body of decisions, issued by bodies including the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and
the CEDAW Committee, as well as national courts, have held States
accountable for failing to meet their obligations under various international human rights conventions with respect to claims concerning gender
violence.135 Although the cases have been decided under a number of different legal instruments, together they offer beginning insights into how
courts and other adjudicatory bodies may define the role of the State in
meeting its due diligence obligation.136
The following analysis highlights two themes that mirror the guiding
normative documents. First, the decisions describe a strong, positive
vision of State obligations.137 This frame provides an enormously valuable
tool to ensure accountability and challenge the root causes of abuse. It
importantly facilitates judicial recognition of the way survivors’ intersect135. The discussion focuses on decisions by international adjudicatory bodies.
Although it references some of the notable decisions from national courts, the formidable body of decisions interpreting country-specific laws is beyond the scope of this
paper. It focuses on decisions brought by or on behalf of gender violence survivors in
which States have been found liable for violating international human rights obligations.
Other decisions, also beyond the scope of this paper, have rejected claims on the basis
that they were inadmissible, and accordingly did not reach the claims on the merits, and
still others have rejected claims on the merits. For further information on topics not
covered in the scope of this Article, see generally HUDOC EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#%7B%22documentcol
lectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22]%7D (last visited July
22, 2015); ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/cases.asp (last visited July 22, 2015);
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women—
Jurisprudence, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/jurisprudence.htm (last visited July 22, 2015). In
addition, because the cases do not distinguish among the respective “Ps” that comprise
the due diligence obligation’s scope, this analysis cannot illuminate how adjudicatory
bodies will interpret the respective obligations to prevent, protect, prosecute, punish, and
provide redress on those terms.
136. For other discussions of the emerging case law, see, e.g., Farrior, supra note 52
(summarizing decisions); Cheryl Hanna, Health, Human Rights, and Violence Against
Women and Girls: Broadly Redefining Affirmative State Duties after Opuz v. Turkey, 34
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 129– 30 (2011) (arguing that the interest in preserving health requires positive state intervention); Hasselbacher, supra note 126; Loveday Hodson, Women’s Rights and the Periphery: CEDAW’s Optional Protocol, 25 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 561 (2014) (also available at University of Leicester School of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 13-01, 2013) (evaluating the impact of cases
decided under CEDAW optional protocol); Ronagh J.A. McQuigg, The European Court of
Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v. Lithuania, 18 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 756
(2014) (critiquing the ECHR’s inconsistent findings with respect to violations of Articles
3 and 8 of the European Convention).
137. See Hanna, supra note 136.
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ing identities exacerbate their harm. At the same time that the decisions
are to be applauded for holding the State to account, they employ reasoning
that raises potential concerns. A number of decisions opine flatly that perpetrators’ rights can never be elevated over victims’ rights.138 Given the
risks associated with State intervention, this categorical judgment may
prove problematic in other more difficult cases. Second, and also like the
guiding international documents, the decisions require that the State adopt
responses sufficiently wide-ranging to call into question whether the State
could meaningfully be held to account for implementation.
1. Ensuring Accountability: Positive Obligations Versus Balancing Rights
a. States’ Positive Obligation to Respond
Courts and the CEDAW Committee have analyzed the scope of a
State’s duty to respond to gender violence in claims brought under international human rights instruments, including Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the European Convention), the Convention of Belém do Pará, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the American Declaration), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Uniformly, the decisions
describe a robust vision of the State’s obligation to respond.139
The ECHR outlined a strong view of the State’s obligations in one of
the most detailed analyses of the scope of a State’s duty to prevent the loss
of life. In Opuz v. Turkey, the ECHR held that Turkey violated provisions of
the European Convention, following a tragic history of an abuser’s escalating violence, two victims’ repeated requests for police protection, and eventually the abuser’s shooting murder of one victim, his mother-in law.140
The court stated the issue in terms of whether the local authorities “displayed due diligence” in the prevention of violence against the applicant
(the abuser’s wife) and her mother (whom the abuser had killed).141 The
court articulated a broad, positive view of the State’s role, holding that the
State’s obligation to create effective criminal law provisions “extends in
appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take
preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at
138. See, e.g., Yildirim v. Austria, Communication No. 6/2005, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/
39/D/6/2005, at ¶¶ 12.1.5, 12.3(b) (Oct. 1, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://
www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=29081.
139. See Istanbul Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 4, 5, 7; Convention of Belém do
Pará, supra note 12, at art. 7; Ninth International Conference of American States, AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN (1948), available at http://
www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.american%20Declaration.htm; CEDAW Gen.
Rec. 28, supra note 111, ¶ 21.
140. Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92945. The case also found violations of Turkey’s obligation to prohibit inhuman or degrading treatment and guaranteeing equal protection of the law. Id.
141. Id. at para. 131.
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risk from the criminal acts of another individual.”142 At least in this context of a case involving the risk to a fundamental right such as the right to
life, the court contemplated a robust, positive role for State intervention:
“. . . it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do
all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate
risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge.”143
The court recognized the difficulty of assigning responsibility to the
State to act, and articulated considerations limiting State responsibility
that have been reiterated in other cases. It stated:
Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made
in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the positive obligation
must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities . . . . For a positive obligation to
arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of
an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they
failed to take measures . . . which, judged reasonably, might have been
expected to avoid that risk.144

This court acknowledged additional considerations limiting State intervention, for example, recognizing that police should “exercise their powers . . .
in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees
which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action[s] . . . .”145
The court recognized that the question of whether the authorities’ actions
fell below this standard for determining negligence could only be answered
in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.146 It
142. Id. at para. 128 (emphasis added) (citing Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 101, para. 115, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-58257). Accord Tomasic v. Croatia, para. 50, HUDOC (Jan. 15,
2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90625.
143. Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 130; Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.
116 (emphasis added).
144. Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 129. Accord Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at
para. 116; Tomasic v. Croatia, paras. 50– 51, HUDOC (Jan. 15, 2009), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90625. The ECHR similarly recognized that the positive obligation of the State to respond must be interpreted in a way
as not to impose “an excessive burden on the authorities” in connection with its obligation to take “reasonable steps” to prevent child sexual abuse in circumstances in which it
had or ought to have had knowledge. O’Keeffe v. Ireland, ¶ 144, HUDOC (Jan. 28,
2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-140235.
145. Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 129 (emphasis added). Accord Osman,
1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 116.
146. Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 130; Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at para.
116. Notably, a concurring opinion in Valiuliene v. Lithuania interpreted the due diligence standard even more strictly. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque opined that:
[a] more rigorous standard of diligence is especially necessary in the context of
certain societies, like Lithuanian society, which are faced with a serious, longlasting and widespread problem of domestic violence. Thus, the emerging due
diligence standard in domestic violence cases is stricter than the classical
Osman test, in as much as the duty to act arises for public authorities when the
risk is already present, although not imminent. If a State knows or ought to
know that a segment of its population, such as women, is subject to repeated
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carefully examined the history of violence, which involved assaults, stabbings, physical injuries (some of which were life threatening), death
threats, and an incident in which the abuser ran his car into his wife and
her mother.147 The history of serious, escalating violence, combined with
the mother’s final call for intervention shortly before the killing, warranted
preventive measures and supported the conclusion that local authorities
could have foreseen the lethal attack.148 The court then took the State
authorities to task for failing entirely to evaluate the threat posed by the
abuser’s conduct.149 It enumerated the many steps the authorities could
have taken under the existing legal framework, such as ordering authorized
protective measures or issuing an injunction.150 Instead, the authorities
merely took statements and released the defendant, thereby failing to meet
their “due diligence” obligation to protect the right to life.151
The ECHR similarly scoured the record of law enforcement responses
to find a violation of the right to life under the European Convention in
Branko Tomasic v. Croatia.152 The court there considered claims that the
State failed to prevent the deaths of a woman and her child by Ms.
Tomasic’s abusive ex-husband, whom psychiatrists had deemed dangerous,
and who had been detained and subsequently released.153 The combination of a history of severe violence— including threats to bomb his child on
his first birthday, a psychiatric evaluation concluding that he was in need
of compulsory psychiatric treatment, and findings that there was a danger
that he would repeat acts of violence— established that the authorities
knew of the threats and therefore should have taken “all reasonable steps”
to protect the woman and her child from future violence.154 The court
reviewed the inadequacy of the psychiatric treatment the abuser had
received before his release, the history of threats, and officials’ recognition
of the seriousness of the threats, and found violations because the authorities failed to take “all necessary and reasonable steps” to protect his wife
and child.155
Other decisions in cases involving failed investigations and flawed
procedures recognize the limits of the ECHR’s authority, while still invokviolence and fails to prevent harm from befalling the members of that group of
people when they face a present (but not yet imminent) risk, the State can be
found responsible by omission for the resulting human rights violations.
Valiuliene v. Lithuiania, para. 30, HUDOC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117636.
147. Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 133(iv).
148. Id. at paras. 134, 136.
149. Id. at para. 147.
150. Id. at para. 148.
151. Id. at paras. 148– 49.
152. Tomasic v. Croatia, HUDOC (Jan. 15, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90625.
153. Id. at paras. 4– 12 (notably, he killed himself as well during the shooting).
154. Id. at paras. 52– 53.
155. Id. at paras. 53– 61. In particular, the court noted the failure to search his premises and his vehicle and the failure to assess the abuser’s condition immediately before
he was released from prison. Id. at paras. 54, 58.
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ing States’ “positive obligations” and finding liability. For example, in a
custody case involving allegations of abuse, the ECHR held Bulgaria
accountable for violating the European Convention’s obligation to secure
respect for the parties’ private and family life.156 The court refused to find
that the Convention required prosecution, reasoning that the ECHR could
not “replace the national authorities[.]”157 Nevertheless, it found violations based on Bulgaria’s failure to adopt interim custody measures without delay, and its failure to take sufficient measures to ensure that the
applicant’s husband refrained from violence.158 Similarly, in Valiuliene v.
Lithuania, the ECHR took a close look at prosecutorial practices and found
that the State had fallen short of its obligation when it failed to prosecute a
domestic violence case involving multiple complaints, such that it eventually became time-barred.159
The IACHR articulated a similarly robust role for the State in enforcing the right to life, among others, in a case brought under the Convention
of Belém do Pará: González et al. (Cotton Field) v. Mexico.160 That case was
brought on behalf of three young women who had disappeared and died in
the context of circumstances in which hundreds of women had been murdered or had disappeared, and in which the State had failed to act.161 The
court grappled with the State’s liability for the disappearances and
murders. In analyzing the States’ obligations, the court distinguished
between the “moment” before the disappearances, when the State was
aware of the general risk for women, but was not aware of a real and imminent danger for the victims in the case, and the “moment” before the discovery of the bodies.162 The State failed to comply “in general” with its
obligation of prevention when it was warned of the pattern of violence.163
But the court concluded that an obligation of “strict due diligence” arose
after the State was aware that there was a real and imminent risk that the
victims in the case would be sexually abused, subjected to ill-treatment,
and killed.164 Here, Mexico did not act with the required due diligence; it
carried out formalities and took statements, but officials taking those statements minimized family members’ concerns, which led to unjustified
156. Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, paras. 83– 84, HUDOC (June 12, 2008), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-86875. Accord Valiuliene v. Lithuania, paras. 76, 85, HUDOC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-117636.
157. Valiuliene, at para. 82.
158. Decisions by the CEDAW Committee similarly have recognized international
human rights bodies’ limited jurisdiction to review local decisions. See, e.g., infra, notes
181 (discussing V.K. v. Bulgaria) and 179 (discussing C.A.S. v. Romania; M.C. v.
Bulgaria).
159. Valiuliene, at paras. 85– 86, HUDOC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117636.
160. González et al. (Cotton Field) v. Mexico, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
161. See id. at paras. 4, 113– 21.
162. Id. at paras. 281– 83.
163. Id. at para. 282.
164. Id. at para. 283.
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delays.165 Although the court did not explicitly require the State to do “all”
it reasonably could do (similar to the ECHR’s ruling), the court signaled a
requirement of meaningful, rather than mere, response.166
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights engaged
in a close review of State responses in Lenahan v. United States and concluded that the United States had violated its due diligence obligation to
prevent violations of the right to life, among others, under the American
Declaration.167 Ms. Lenahan initially brought suit in an American court,
claiming that law enforcement violated her constitutional right to procedural due process, and claiming that local law enforcement failed meaningfully to respond to her call for assistance after her abusive partner
abducted her three children, who then were killed in a shootout at the
police precinct later that evening.168 The United States Supreme Court
rejected her claim.169 She then filed a complaint with the Inter-American
Commission.170
The Commission took seriously the broad language of Ms. Lenahan’s
protective order, and found that the police should have used “every reasonable means” to enforce the order after Ms. Lenahan put them on notice
through multiple calls, expressing concern and imploring the police to
intervene.171 The Commission detailed the steps the police reasonably
could have taken, and found the local police’s response “fragmented, uncoordinated and unprepared.”172 The Commission catalogued a range of
State failures, both in law enforcement’s response to Ms. Lenahan’s
calls,173 and in inadequate policies and procedures.174 It made numerous
recommendations for individual and systemic relief that would promote
165. Id. at para. 284.
166. See id. at paras. 289– 290.
167. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.142, doc. 11 (2011), available at
http://www.equalaccessadvocates.com/2011%20August%2008%20Petitioners%20%20Report%20No%20%2080-11.pdf.
168. Id. at paras. 24, 32, 37.
169. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
170. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, at para. 1.
171. Id. at paras. 141– 147. For example, the restraining order directed law enforcement officials: “You shall use every reasonable means to enforce the restraining order.
You shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical, seek a warrant for the arrest of the
restrained person . . . . You are authorized to use every reasonable effort to protect the
alleged victim and the alleged victim’s children to prevent further violence.” Id. at para.
140 (citing language of protective order).
172. Id. at para. 150.
173. Noted failures included, for example, failing to review the restraining order to
ascertain its terms; consistently asking Ms. Lenahan the same questions during each of
her eight calls; failing to call the police department in the neighboring jurisdiction after
Ms. Lenahan informed them that Mr. Gonzales had taken her children there; and failing
to conduct a criminal background check of Mr. Gonzales. Id.
174. For example, the Commission detailed the lack of a protocol for how to respond
to protective order violations involving missing children; inadequate training; failure to
understand law enforcement’s responsibility for enforcing protective orders; and failing
to implement a background check system for gun purchases, which tragically led the FBI
to allow Mr. Gonzales to purchase a gun. Id. at paras. 152– 59.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN202.txt

332

unknown

Seq: 32

23-SEP-15

Cornell International Law Journal

8:31

Vol. 48

law enforcement accountability and equality.175
With respect to the duty to investigate and prosecute, the Inter-American Commission took a broad view of States’ obligations and concluded
that Brazil’s failure to prosecute in Maria da Penha’s case and other similar
cases exacerbated the harm committed by her husband, and indicated that
the State condones the violence.176 The Commission found a “general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action” in prosecuting and convicting aggressors, which signaled a failure of the State’s obligations to
prosecute and convict, as well as to prevent future acts.177 That Brazil had
undertaken some positive steps to address the issue did not mitigate its
obligations, given the ongoing “ineffective judicial action, impunity and the
inability of victims to obtain compensation[.]”178 This robust view of the
duty to investigate mirrors that enumerated in the Cotton Field and
Lenahan decisions discussed above. Decisions of other bodies similarly
underscore States’ positive obligations, for example, to conduct effective
investigations of sexual assault that are in line with relevant modern standards, and that take all reasonable steps to secure evidence promptly and
analyze testimony.179 Specifically, the ECHR has acknowledged its limited
role in reviewing national courts’ determinations in criminal prosecutions,
but has nevertheless found procedures and practices lacking when those
courts have failed to comport with modern standards.180
The CEDAW Committee has also taken an expansive view of a State’s
obligations to provide meaningful access to legal redress. In V.K. v. Bulgaria, for example, the Committee recognized that the State had taken steps
to address domestic violence through laws and special procedures, but ana175. Id. at para. 201.
176. See Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 (2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
cases/54-01.html.
177. Id. at para. 56.
178. Id. at para. 57.
179. See, e.g., C.K. v. Commissioner of Police, Petition 8 of 2012, Kenya Law Reports,
Republic of Kenya, High Court at Meru (2013) http://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/Avon
Resources/CK%20v%20Commissioner%20of%20Police%20-%20Kenya.pdf (discussing
“defilement” of young women); C.A.S. v. Romania, HUDOC (Mar. 20, 2012), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109741 (discussing repeated
sexual assault of seven year old boy); M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61521 (discussing sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old young woman). Accord Charmichele v. Minister of
Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938, at paras. 73, 74 (holding that the prosecutor might
be liable for failing to bring information about a defendant’s violent history or threats
when defendant is subsequently released and causes the threatened harm); Jane Doe v.
Metropolitan Toronto Police (1998), 39 O.R. 3d. 487, 160 D.L.R. 4th 698 (Ont. Ct. Gen
Div.) (finding that police owed and violated duty of care to women in a neighborhood in
which a series of stranger rapes had been reported by failing to warn them and failing to
investigate the complaints).
180. C.A.S., paras. 73– 83, HUDOC (Mar. 20, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109741; M.C., 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 185. See
also, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Ireland, paras. 162– 169, 173– 173, HUDOC (Jan. 28, 2014), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-140235 (finding a failure of
reporting mechanisms but not a failure to investigate, because the investigation was
undertaken after a complaint had been made).
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lyzed compliance by considering whether the applicant could “enjoy the
practical realization” of the Convention’s promise of gender equality,
human rights, and fundamental freedoms.181 The Committee noted its
limited jurisdiction to review local courts’ assessments of facts and evidence with respect to that court’s refusal to issue a protective order, unless
the assessment was “arbitrary” or “otherwise discriminatory.”182 Yet the
Committee also emphasized the State’s broad obligation to modify or abolish discriminatory customs, practices, laws, and regulations, and that the
State must take “all appropriate measures” to eliminate discrimination
against women in marriage and family-related matters.183 It concluded
that the local court’s rejection of the applicant’s request for a protective
order based on a restrictive reading of the statute “reflect[ed] a stereotyped
and overly narrow concept of what constitutes domestic violence.”184
Moreover, by failing to make shelters available, the State failed to fulfill its
obligation to provide for the immediate protection of women from violence
under CEDAW and its General Recommendation 19.185
This robust view of State obligations can counter historical biases and
unresponsiveness, and may promote best practices. Indeed, this view of
States’ obligations, drawing on the guiding documents’ direction to address
root causes and intersectional discrimination, has the potential to advance
transformative anti-subordination goals. Some decisions recognize how
gender discrimination operates to deprive domestic violence survivors of
meaningful remedies.186 Others identify, enumerate, and condemn the
operation of stereotypes. For example, the CEDAW Committee found violations based on stereotypes about survivors of rape codified both in statutory definitions and judicial interpretations.187
Importantly, this broad approach to State obligations also facilitates
recognition of multiple and intersecting discrimination. For example, the
Inter-American Commission found that the United States’ systemic failure
to respond to Jessica Lenahan’s calls for intervention was particularly
troubling because it “took place in a context where there ha[d] been a historical problem with the enforcement of protection orders”— specifically,
those around ethnic and racial minorities, and low income women.188 The
CEDAW Committee has reached similar conclusions.189 In Jallow v. Bulgaria, the Committee found that Bulgaria had violated its obligation to react
181. V.K. v. Bulgaria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
No. 20/2008, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 (2011).
182. Id. at para. 9.6.
183. Id. at para. 9.11.
184. Id. at para. 9.12.
185. Id. at para. 9.13.
186. See, e.g., id. at para. 9.9.
187. Vertido v. Philippines, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, No. 18/2008, ¶¶ 8.5– 8.8, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/caselaw/CEDAW
%20C%2046%20DR%2018%202008_en%20Vertido%20v%20%20Philippines.pdf.
188. Lenahan, Case 12.626, at para. 161.
189. See, e.g., V.K. v. Bulgaria, No. 20/2008, at ¶ 9.4.
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“actively” to discrimination.190 The prosecutor had refused to investigate
allegations of abuse against the applicant’s husband and instead issued an
emergency protection order against the applicant that separated her from
her daughter. The Committee concluded that the State had violated its
obligation to establish laws and procedures to ensure protection from discrimination, particularly because of the applicant’s vulnerable position as
an “illiterate migrant woman” who did not speak Bulgarian, who lacked
relatives in the State party, who had a young daughter to care for, and who
was dependent on husband.191 Similarly, the CEDAW Committee in Kell
v. Canada recognized how a woman’s dual statuses as aboriginal and a
survivor of domestic violence combined to violate her right to housing.192
Other cases allowed for arguments that foregrounded how complainants’
experiences with multiple forms of subordination exacerbated their
abuse.193 Yet this broad approach also poses the risk of State overreach in
more challenging cases.
b. Balancing Defendants’ and Victims’ Rights
By holding States accountable for meaningful intervention, these
tribunals aim to secure actual reform, rather than mere responsive action.
Yet ascribing such responsibility for State intervention may prove difficult
when intervention risks infringement on a defendant’s rights or when State
intervention contradicts the wishes of a survivor. These issues will arise
most often in cases that analyze law enforcement officials’ determinations
of whether to undertake criminal justice interventions. A few courts have
addressed these competing concerns in decisions that analyze whether
States failing to respond to requests for intervention have considered the
difficult question of how to balance the rights of defendants and victims
when their interests conflict. Recognizing this tension, the ECHR and the
CEDAW Committee have articulated and invoked a broad and seemingly
categorical principle stating that a “perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede
victims’ human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity.”194
190. See Jallow v. Bulgaria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, No. 32/2011, ¶ 8.4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (2012).
191. Id. at paras. 8.2, 8.5.
192. Kell v. Canada, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
No. 19/2008, ¶ 10.2 CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008 (2012) (concerning an aboriginal
domestic violence survivor who lost access to her home and was subjected to intersectional discrimination).
193. E.g., Goekce v. Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, No. 5/2005, ¶ 3.7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (2007) (asking for
effective remedies, particularly for migrant women), available at http://www.bayefsky.
com/pdf/austria_cedaw_t5_5_2005.pdf; Yildirim v. Austria, Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, No. 6/2005, ¶ 3.7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/
2005 (2007), available at http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=29081.
194. E.g., Yildirim, No. 6/2005 at paras. 12.1.5, 12.3(b) (emphasis added); Goekce,
No. 5/2005 at paras. 12.1.5, 12.3(b); A.T. v. Hungary, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, No. 2/2003, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003
(2005), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/hungary_t5_cedaw_2_2003.pdf;
Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, para. 147.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-2\CIN202.txt

2015

unknown

Due Diligence and Gender Violence

Seq: 35

23-SEP-15

8:31

335

No doubt, this approach may be heralded by those concerned about
the historical and ongoing under-enforcement of cases involving gender
violence. This statement of principle is not surprising given the trajectory
of advocacy encouraging State intervention and the historical backdrop of
States’ refusal to intervene. Yet it is easy to imagine that this general statement could be interpreted to authorize criminal intervention against perpetrators, seemingly without limitation, even in cases in which intervention
contravenes the survivors’ wishes or in cases with less egregious facts than
those in the decisions reported to date.195
Each of the cases in which this principle was invoked involved severe
histories of violence, apparently marginal responses from law enforcement,
and victims who actively sought law enforcement intervention. For example, two early cases relied on this principle in holding Austria accountable
for failing to respond adequately to a victim’s calls for law enforcement
assistance. In Yildirim v. Austria, the CEDAW Committee considered a
claim on behalf of a woman killed by her abusive husband.196 The abusive
husband had subjected his wife to escalating acts of violence, which
resulted in calls to the police and an injunction issued against him.197
Moreover, the abusive husband had harassed his wife and made several
threats to kill her, including threats issued at her workplace.198 At various
points, the police either declined Ms. Yildirim’s requests that her husband
be detained,199 failed to report incidents of harassment,200 or responded
to the reports of his threats and harassment by speaking to him or passing
the complaint on to other law enforcement officials.201 After Ms. Yildirim
filed a petition for divorce, Mr. Yildirim followed her home from work and
fatally stabbed her.202
The Committee applied a negligence standard to determine that the
Austrian authorities knew or should have known that the situation was
“extremely dangerous,” and accordingly should not have denied the
requests to place Mr. Yildirim in detention.203 It concluded that law
enforcement’s failure to detain him violated Austria’s due diligence obligation to protect Ms. Yildirim.204 The Committee implicitly acknowledged
the difficulty of the judgment; it recognized Austria’s argument that an
arrest warrant seemed “disproportionately invasive” at the time of the
195. In a decision addressing the related question of the respective rights of complainants and defendants at trial, the Constitutional Court of South Africa took into account
the nuances raised in cases of intimate partner violence, but nevertheless struck a balance that would recognize the presumption of innocence and a defendant’s right to a fair
trial under South Africa’s constitution. See State v. Baloyi, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 15 (S.
Afr.).
196. Yildirim, No. 6/2005 at paras. 2.2– 2.5.
197. Id.
198. Id. at paras. 2.6– 2.8.
199. Id. at paras. 2.4, 2.10.
200. Id. at para. 2.6.
201. Id. at paras. 2.7– 2.10.
202. Id. at paras. 2.11– 2.14.
203. Id. at para. 12.1.4.
204. Id. at para. 12.1.5.
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request for detention.205 Nevertheless, the Committee invoked the statement elevating “women’s human rights” over the “perpetrators’ rights” and
concluded that the scales tipped in favor of State intervention.206
The Committee referenced that same principle in another case in
which it also concluded that Austria had violated CEDAW’s obligations for
failing to respond to another victim’s calls for law enforcement assistance.
The decision in Goekce v. Austria involved a similar history of escalating
violence and threats over a three-year period: the case involved disturbances and disputes, including threats that Mr. Goecke would kill his wife,
calls to the police, injunctions prohibiting Mr. Goekce’s return to the home,
violations of those injunctions, and denials of requests that he be
detained.207 The police did not check whether a weapons prohibition was
in effect against Mr. Goekce even though they apparently knew that he had
a handgun, and even though Ms. Goekce’s father and brother had alerted
the police to Mr. Goekce’s threats to kill her.208 The prosecutor had
stopped a prosecution against Mr. Goekce for causing bodily harm and
making a criminal and dangerous threat on the grounds that there was
insufficient reason to prosecute him.209 Two days later, Mr. Goekce shot
Ms. Goekce in front of their two daughters.210 Ms. Goekce had called the
emergency call service a few hours before she was killed, yet no patrol car
was sent in response.211
As in Yildirim, the CEDAW Committee concluded that the police
“knew or should have known” that Ms. Goekce was in serious danger,
given the long record of disturbances and calls to the police, including the
call immediately preceding the shooting.212 The Committee similarly
acknowledged the need to determine whether detention would unduly
interfere with a perpetrators’ rights to freedom of movement and a fair trial,
but deferred, without additional analysis, to the view stated above, that “the
perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede women’s human rights to life and to
physical and mental integrity.”213 The Committee noted that Mr. Goekce
had “crossed a high threshold of violence,” and that the prosecutor should
not have denied requests to detain him, given its knowledge of that
history.214

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Goekce v. Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, No. 5/2005, ¶¶ 2.1– 2.12, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (2007), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/austria_cedaw_t5_5_2005.pdf.
208. Id. at para. 2.9.
209. Id. at para. 2.10.
210. Id. at para. 2.11.
211. Id. at para. 12.1.3.
212. Id. at para. 12.1.4.
213. Id. at para. 12.1.5.
214. Id.
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The decision in A.T. v. Hungary likewise held the State accountable for
failed law enforcement response to a survivor of domestic violence.215
That case involved a four-year history of regular and severe domestic violence and threats by the petitioner’s common law husband.216 At the time,
Hungary lacked procedures for protection or restraining orders, and no
shelters were available to the petitioner because none were equipped to
accommodate her as well as her children, one of whom was disabled.217
The allegations enumerated a history of civil and criminal charges, none of
which resulted in detention, and none of which were effective in barring
her abuser from her apartment.218 Subsequent to the initial events leading
to the complaint, Hungary had instituted a set of reforms, but it admitted
that the legal and institutional arrangements were not yet ready to assist
survivors effectively.219 The CEDAW Committee agreed, noting that
domestic violence cases were not prioritized in court proceedings.220 With
respect to the balance between defendants’ and victims’ rights, it repeated
the statement that “[w]omen’s human rights to life and to physical and
mental integrity cannot be superseded by other rights, including the right
to property and the right to privacy.”221 The Committee was particularly
concerned that no legislation had been enacted to address domestic violence and sexual harassment, and that no protection or exclusion orders or
shelters exist for survivors’ immediate protection.222
The ECHR explicitly grappled with the difficult question of how to
balance defendants’ with victims’ rights in cases in which a victim drops
charges. In Opuz, the government contended that it had been constrained
to terminate criminal proceedings against the defendant because the victims had withdrawn their complaints, and the governing statutes accordingly prohibited them from pursuing prosecution.223 The court invoked
the categorical elevation of victims’ over defendants’ rights in the course of
analyzing whether the authorities had displayed “due diligence” to prevent
the killing.224
The resulting analysis presents the most detailed consideration in any
of the reported cases about States’ obligations with respect to mandatory
law enforcement interventions. The court noted that there is no general
consensus internationally about mandatory prosecution when the victim
withdraws her complaints.225 It enumerated a set of factors that should be
215. A.T. v. Hungary, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
No. 2/2003, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), available at http://www
.bayefsky.com/pdf/hungary_t5_cedaw_2_2003.pdf.
216. Id. at para. 2.1.
217. Id. at para. 2.1.
218. Id. at paras. 2.2– 2.7, 9.4.
219. Id. at para. 9.3.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, ¶ 144, available at http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92945.
224. Id. at para. 147.
225. Id. at para. 138.
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taken into account in deciding whether to pursue the prosecution,
including:
-

“the seriousness of the offence;
whether the victim’s injuries are physical or psychological;
if the defendant used a weapon;
if the defendant has made any threats since the attack;
if the defendant planned the attack;
the effect (including psychological on any children living in the
household);
the chances of the defendant offending again;
the continuing threat to the health and safety of the victim or anyone else
who was, or could become, involved;
the current state of the victim’s relationship with the defendant;
the effect on that relationship of continuing with the prosecution against
the victim’s wishes;
the history of the relationship, particularly if there had been any other
violence in the past;
and the defendant’s criminal history, particularly any previous
violence.”226

Accordingly, the more serious the offense or the greater the risk of further
offenses, the more likely the prosecution should continue even if the victim
withdraws a complaint.227 Applying the standard to the history of severe
violence and ongoing complaints, and considering that the victims indicated that they had withdrawn their complaints because of the abuser’s
death threats, the court concluded that the authorities did not adequately
consider the enumerated factors.228
The Opuz court discussed the argument (propounded by the government) that it was precluded from interfering because doing so would violate the victims’ rights to family privacy (protected under Article 8 of the
European Convention).229 The court recognized the particular concerns
that arise in domestic violence cases, and stated that interference with private or family life may sometimes be necessary in order to protect the life
or health of others, or to prevent commission of future criminal acts.230
But in issuing its conclusion, the court did not engage the factors it had
articulated and seemingly tipped the scale in favor of intervention: “[O]nce
the situation has been brought to their attention, the national authorities
cannot rely on the victim’s attitude for their failure to take adequate measures which could prevent the likelihood of an aggressor carrying out his
threats against the physical integrity of the victim.”231 Without further
226. Id. at para. 138.
227. Id. at para. 139.
228. Id. at para. 143.
229. This obligation can be invoked both to support intervention (to promote respectful family relations), and non-intervention (to promote privacy). As such, it may be the
focus of important interpretation in future cases. See Stedman, supra note 15, at 12
(arguing that the ECHR decision in Bevacqua, declining to find that the Bulgarian Penal
Code violated Article 8, could send “mixed signals and undermine the validity of justice” because it authorizes deviation from universal human rights principles).
230. Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 144.
231. Id. at para. 153.

R
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analysis, the court concluded that in this case, the seriousness of the risk
to the abuser’s mother-in-law, presumably reflected in the long history of
severe violence, rendered such intervention necessary.232
For future applications, the factors enumerated in Opuz could provide
a useful blueprint for evaluating the reasonableness of State intervention,
particularly in cases in which a survivor or victim declined to pursue prosecution or dropped charges. Notably here, Ms. Opuz and her mother had
dropped charges because they feared retaliation.233 This makes the case
for intervention easier than those in which the survivor no longer wants
the police to intervene. Other cases may be less clear-cut. More explicit
reasoning about how a court should weigh the reasonableness of State
intervention in these difficult and contested cases would help guide future
decisions. The factors enumerated in Opuz could prove useful for weighing
a victims’ autonomy and right to decline intervention versus a State’s concern for safety.
2. State’s Obligation to Provide Redress
Like the guiding documents,234 the decisions recommend a breadth of
remedies that could prove difficult to monitor and measure. The judgments and recommendations for compliance include concrete steps such
as providing compensation to a survivor for out of pocket expenses, as well
as broad aspirational goals such as ensuring that all rights are fully
enforced, that fair legislation is enacted and accessible, and that officials
are fully trained. As just one example, in the Cotton Field decision, the
IACHR ordered reparations to the beneficiaries of the women who disappeared and were killed.235 The court went on to define “full reparation” to
include “all necessary judicial and administrative measures to complete the
investigation, find, prosecute and punish the perpetrator or perpetrators
and mastermind or masterminds and provide full information on the
results.”236 It prescribed comprehensive responses, for example that “all
factual or juridical obstacles” to a full investigation shall be removed,237
that the remedial investigation “be conducted in accordance with protocols
and manuals that comply” with the directives in the judgment,238 and that
232. Id. at paras. 143– 44. The court then grappled with the argument that Turkey’s
then-applicable criminal code prevented pursuing the criminal investigation because the
acts had “not resulted in sickness or unfitness for work for ten days or more.” Id. at para.
145. The court was not constrained by that limitation: “[t]he legislative framework
preventing effective protection for victims of domestic violence aside, the Court must
also consider whether the local authorities displayed due diligence to protect the right to
life of the applicant’s mother in other respects.” Id. at para. 146 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at paras. 18, 35.
234. See supra pt. III.A.
235. González et al. (Cotton Field) v. Mexico, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_205_ing.pdf(reparations include financial remuneration, rehabilitation
and costs).
236. Id. at para. 452.
237. Id. at para. 455(a).
238. Id. at para. 455(b).
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the entities involved in the investigation “shall have the necessary human
and material resources” to carry out their obligations.239 The court set out
a similarly broad mandate with respect to sanctioning the officials who
committed irregularities leading to the murders240 and in connection with
irregularities in the investigation of the victims’ families’ complaints about
harassment.241 The court required the government to adopt a wide range
of guarantees of non-repetition,242 and to engage in public acts honoring
the victims and commemorating the atrocities.243 Additional remedies
include standardizing protocols, federal investigation criteria, expert services, and provision of justice to combat the disappearances, murders, and
other types of violence against women.244 These prescriptions are wideranging and laudable, and they chart a comprehensive vision of meaningful
response. Yet their very scope raises questions about how and whether
compliance might be achieved or measured.
The IACHR is not alone in using sweeping language to describe States’
remedial obligations. The CEDAW decisions proscribe similarly broad
relief in decisions under its optional protocol. For example, in S.V.P. v.
Bulgaria, the CEDAW Committee found that Bulgaria had violated the
CEDAW Convention’s provisions by failing to provide adequate support
and protection to a child victim of rape.245 After some delay, the charges
had been resolved through a plea-bargain that provided for a suspended
sentence and that did not award compensation for pain and suffering; the
young woman had been unable to secure compensation under existing
laws.246 The CEDAW Committee found Bulgaria in violation for failing to
adopt legislation that would “effectively punish rape and sexual violence.”247 The CEDAW Committee also found that the lack of legislation
providing compensation, including moral damages, violated CEDAW;
among other things, the Committee recommended various types of legislative reform.248
Adopting legislation is a challenging goal that leaves many questions
unanswered. For example, what are the parameters of acceptable legislation? That said, enacting legislation is a relatively concrete remedy in comparison to some of the other, more aspirational recommendations, which
239. Id. at para. 455(c).
240. See id. at paras. 456– 60.
241. See id. at paras. 461– 63.
242. See id. at paras. 474– 93.
243. See id. at paras. 464– 73.
244. See id. at paras. 497– 543.
245. S.V.P. v. Bulgaria, No. 31/2011, Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (2012), http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/caselaw/SVP%20v%20Bulgar
ia%20%28CEDAW%29.pdf.
246. Id. at para. 9.2.
247. Id. at para. 9.5.
248. See id. at paras. 9.9, 9.11, 10(2)(a)– (e). For example, the Committee recommended legislative reform that would ensure that Bulgarian law on sexual violence
against women and girls would be “defined in line with international standards.” Id. at
para. 10(2)(a).
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are even less readily susceptible to measurement and specification. For
example, CEDAW Committee recommendations implore the State to take
measures, for example, including requirements that States:
(a) Strengthen implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the
Protection against Violence within the Family and related criminal law, by
acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence against
women and adequately providing for sanctions for the failure to do so;
(b) Vigilantly and in a speedy manner prosecute perpetrators of domestic
violence in order to convey to offenders and the public that society condemns domestic violence as well as ensure that criminal and civil remedies
are utilized in cases where the perpetrator in a domestic violence situation
poses a dangerous threat to the victim and also ensure that in all action
taken to protect women from violence, due consideration is given to the
safety of women, emphasizing that the perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede
women’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity;
(c) Ensure enhanced coordination among law enforcement and judicial
officers, and also ensure that all levels of the criminal justice system (police,
public prosecutors, judges) routinely cooperate with non-governmental organizations that work to protect and support women victims of gender-based
violence;
(d) Strengthen training programmes and education on domestic violence for
judges, lawyers and law enforcement officials, including on the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation 19 of the Committee, and the Optional Protocol
thereto.249

Similarly, the recommendations in AT v. Hungary sweep broadly. They
include recommendations with respect to the applicant, which would have
the State: “(a) [t]ake immediate and effective measures to guarantee the
physical and mental integrity of A.T. and her family; and (b) [e]nsure that
A.T. is given a safe home . . . appropriate child support and legal assistance
as well as reparation.”250
The recommendations also include general proscriptions, including
aspirational goals such as taking steps to:
[r]espect, protect, promote and fulfill women’s human rights . . . ; assure
victims of domestic violence the maximum protection of the law . . . ; [t]ake
all necessary measures to ensure that the national strategy for the prevention
and effective treatment of violence within the family is promptly implemented and evaluated . . . ; [and] take all necessary measures to provide
regular training on [CEDAW].251
249. Yildirim v. Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, No. 6/2005, ¶ 12.3(a)– (d), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005(2007), available at http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=29081; Goekce v. Austria, Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, No. 5/2005, ¶ 12.3(a)– (d), U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (2007), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/
austria_cedaw_t5_5_2005.pdf.
250. A.T. v. Hungary, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
No. 2/2003, ¶ 9.6 (I)(a)– (b), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), available at
http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/hungary_t5_cedaw_2_2003.pdf.
251. Id. at para. 9.6(II)(a)– (d).
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The recommendations also call on Hungary to implement the CEDAW
Committee’s Concluding Observations, to investigate “all” allegations of
domestic violence, and to “bring the offenders to justice in accordance with
international standards; to provide victims with safe and prompt access to
justice, and to provide offenders rehabilitation programs.”252
The CEDAW Committee similarly recommended sweeping relief in
Vertido v. Philippines, a case in which the president of the Chamber of Commerce raped a female employee.253 The applicant’s criminal complaint was
initially dismissed for lack of probable cause; the prosecution proceeded
after she successfully appealed that initial decision, but there were long
delays in the time it took to affect the defendant’s arrest and conduct the
trial, and the defendant was ultimately acquitted.254 The Committee
detailed the ways in which applicable case law and the local court’s adjudication reflected gender bias and stereotypes about rape.255 It concluded
that the eight-year period in which the case remained at the trial court
violated the “right to a remedy” implied by CEDAW, and reasoned that for
a remedy to be effective, adjudication must occur “in a fair impartial,
timely and expeditious manner.”256 In addition to ordering “appropriate
compensation,” the Committee required the State, among other things, to
“take effective measures” to ensure that adjudications involving rape proceed without delay, and to “ensure” that “all legal procedures” in rape and
other sexual offense cases are “impartial and fair and not affected by
prejudices or stereotypical gender notions.”257 The Committee also recognized that “a wide range of measures are needed,” including legislative
reform and training.258
Likewise, the Committee recommended that Belarus take measures to
“ensure the protection” of the “dignity and privacy, as well as the physical
and psychological safety” of women detainees, to “ensure access to genderspecific health care” for women detainees, and to “ensure” effective investigation, prosecution, and adequate punishment in response to allegations
by women detainees about discriminatory, cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. These recommendations stemmed from a complaint by a
woman journalist who was sexually harassed and subjected to degrading
252. Id. at para. 9.6(II)(e)– (h).
253. Vertido v. Philippines, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, No. 18/2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010), available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/caselaw/CEDAW%20C%20
46%20DR%2018%202008_en%20Vertido%20v%20%20Philippines.pdf.
254. See id. at paras. 2.6– 7, 2.9 (detailing, for example, that the defendant was
arrested eighty days after issuance of an arrest warrant, and that the case remained at
the trial court from 1997 to 2005).
255. See id. at paras. 8.5– 7.
256. See id. at para. 8.3.
257. Id. at para. 8.9(b).
258. Id. Notably, a concurring opinion refused to opine whether the defendant
would have been convicted absent gender myths and stereotypes, and emphasized that
the Committee is not equipped to evaluate witness credibility. See id. at paras. 18– 19
(Yoko Hayashi, concurring).
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treatment while detained.259 Additionally, the Committee recommended
“adequate safeguards” to protect women detainees from “all forms of
abuse,” training for personnel assigned to work with women detainees, and
both policies and “comprehensive programmes” to “ensure the needs of
women prisoners are met.”260
Broad remedial powers are among the advantages of international
human rights enforcement. While these sweeping recommendations hold
tremendous potential as advocacy tools, they may pose challenges in more
traditional enforcement contexts. In the absence of any State intervention,
calling for State action may seem like, and may in fact be, a good idea. At
the same time, the enumeration of such a comprehensive list of remedies
raises the specter that compliance may be reduced to checklists which,
while useful, do not afford a means for evaluating the quality or effectiveness of a particular intervention. While the breadth of the asserted remedies constitutes a valuable tool for advocacy, mechanisms must be created
to assess both the quality and effectiveness of interventions such as training, eradicating stereotypes, and other critical but broad measures. Absent
nuanced assessment mechanisms, States will be able to tout their compliance within the language of the remedy without meaningfully addressing
underlying concerns, and without ensuring that historic patterns of criminal justice bias are not simply strengthened by State responses to gender
violence.
IV. The Way Forward: Toward Accountability
The preceding review of guiding normative documents and case law
highlights both the promise and the challenges emerging as due diligence
principles are applied to gender violence. The broad conception of States’
positive obligation to respond can engender robust policy and programmatic advances. But inviting State responses also poses risks, particularly
with respect to criminal justice interventions. At a minimum, the risks
should be taken into account when advocates and policymakers consider a
particular type of intervention in a particular context. This Part offers a
few beginning suggestions.
First, advocates should critically consider how, why, and in what context State responsiveness should be sought before endorsing particular
reforms. Calls for a robust role for the State may make most sense in contexts in which the State has not acted at all. For example, legislation proscribing acts of gender violence may be called for where there are no laws
prohibiting gender violence or where the government affords no support
for social services and prevention.
259. Abramova v. Belarus, No. 23/2009, ¶ 7.9(2)(a)– (c), Comm. on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009
(2011), http://www.worldcourts.com/cedaw/eng/decisions/2011.07.25_Abramova_v_
Belarus.pdf.
260. Id. at para. 7.9(2)(d)– (f).
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Second, interpretations of due diligence principles should take into
account existing critiques of the role of the State. For example, policybased and judicial interpretations can employ balancing tests that explicitly consider whether a particular decision triggers problems attendant
either to over-responsiveness or to under-responsiveness.261 Interpretations should consider the impact of any intervention on those at the margins, and should take into account the experiences and recommendations
of both advocates and survivors.
Third, analyses of State responses that contemplate fulfilling any of
the due diligence obligations should recognize that States may meet their
obligations by exercising discretion not to respond or by delegating
response to others. This may entail delegating the response to a community-based NGO.262 In this context, it is more helpful to think of the State’s
obligation as State accountability, rather than State responsiveness.
Fourth, the due diligence principle should explicitly be interpreted in
conjunction with other foundational human rights principles— including
equality, autonomy, and dignity— which have been incorporated into recent
decisions, reports, and commentary on gender violence. Many of the policy documents and recent decisions explicitly do so. Adjudicators of
future complaints might explicitly invoke the factors enumerated in Opuz
as a tool for balancing competing interests when evaluating the efficacy of
law enforcement intervention in a particular case.263 Future decision-makers can draw on the ways anti-discrimination concerns have been incorporated into prior decisions in future cases.264
Finally, it may be that the type of State response sought makes a difference. For example, the exercise of State power to punish or to coerce then
triggers different concerns than the exercise of State power to distribute
resources, or to ensure the comprehensive and accessible delivery of social
and legal services. As Beth Richie has said, we might urge State intervention that is “caring, but not controlling.”265 A different set of analyses may
be called for in those dissimilar contexts.
The tensions inherent in seeking an enhanced role for the State raise
critical questions about how to tap the potential of the due diligence obligation without replicating problems with State intervention. The cases and
guiding international documents highlight the fact that it is much easier to
261. See Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, ¶ 138, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92945.
262. Of course, NGOs must receive adequate compensation for providing services.
The challenging question of whether a State entity can or should fund particular services without, in turn, requiring particular approaches or methodologies, is beyond the
scope of this paper.
263. See Opuz, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 138.
264. See, e.g., supra pt. III.B.3 (discussing cases advancing anti-discrimination
concerns).
265. Beth Richie, Director of the Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy and
Professor of African American Studies and Criminology, Law and Justice at The University of Illinois at Chicago, Keynote Address at The University of Miami School of Law
CONVERGE! Conference (Feb. 7, 2014).
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identify failures of State responsibility than it is to be prescriptive in the
first order about what the State ought to do.266 The interpretations favoring State intervention make sense in light of the long history of State
refusal and failure to respond to or to sanction intimate partner and sexual
violence.267 Yet, we need to be careful that in the push for State accountability, we do not romanticize the role of the State or the ability of the criminal justice system to address effectively the problem of gender violence.
We also need to ensure that we construct policies, plans, services, and law
enforcement measures that minimize and redress discrimination in minority communities, as opposed to exacerbating historic inequities. Thoughtful advocacy about how to balance these competing concerns can chart a
course towards effective reforms.

266. See supra pts. III.A– B.
267. See supra pt. III.B.1.a.
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